Cornell Law Review
Volume 101
Issue 1 November 2015

Article 2

Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence
Brandon L. Garrett

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 57 (2015)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol101/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN102.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

28-OCT-15

12:01

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE
Brandon L. Garrett†
When a constitutional right conflicts with an evidentiary
rule that would otherwise allow a piece of evidence to be
admitted at trial, should the constitutional right be a “trump”?
The Supreme Court and lower courts have often interpreted
the Constitution to abstain from regulating questions of trial
evidence. Taking the opposite course, courts have displaced
evidence law to dramatic effect, as with the Court’s exclusionary rule, Confrontation Clause, and punitive damages jurisprudence. In areas that provide a more attractive model, the
Court has instead sought to accommodate constitutional and
evidence law. The fundamental problem of adjudicating the
intersection of the Constitution and the law of evidence has
not been the subject of judicial standards or academic commentary. Despite their importance, such questions have been
seen as confined to the particular criminal or civil procedure
contexts in which they arise. Indeed, I argue that due to this
neglect, important rights, such as the Miranda right, have
been misunderstood as outliers, subconstitutional, or merely
prophylactic. This Article develops why constitutional evidence law should in some respects be viewed apart from other
areas of constitutional law. Second, I explore what norms
should define the intersection of constitutional and evidence
law. Third, I set out a framework in the form of standards of
constitutional review, standards for avoidance, and canons of
interpretation to govern intersections of constitutional law and
the law of evidence. This Article ultimately seeks to describe
the ways in which constitutional rights can intersect with
rules of evidence and how courts might more clearly and consistently approach such conflicts and questions. Far from a
subject to be avoided, constitutional rights have long protected
against evidentiary abuses at trial. Conversely, evidence law
principles can improve the effectiveness of constitutional protections and prevent unanticipated erosion of constitutional
rights.
† Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to
Kerry Abrams, Josh Bowers, Anne Coughlin, Kim Ferzan, Lisa Griffin, David
Jaros, John Monahan, Caleb Nelson, Fred Schauer, David Sklansky, Bobbie
Spellman, and participants at a workshop at UVA School of Law for their invaluable comments on early drafts and to Brian Rho for his excellent research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
When a constitutional right conflicts with an evidentiary
rule that would otherwise bar or allow a piece of evidence to be
admitted at trial, should the constitutional right always be a
“trump”? Since the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the
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land, one would expect constitutional rights to apply and to
then change the result at a civil or criminal trial. Yet courts,
including the Supreme Court, have frequently interpreted the
Constitution to abstain from questions of evidence law. Sometimes, however, courts have taken the opposite course, as in
the case of the exclusionary rule, and have outright displaced
evidence law to dramatic effect. Despite their importance, the
problems that lie at the intersection of the Constitution and the
law of evidence have typically been seen as separate and confined to the particular criminal or civil procedure or evidentiary
contexts in which they arise.1 Nor have courts adopted any
consistent framework for answering the questions that arise by
fashioning standards of review or canons of interpretation.
This Article aims to explore this as a general problem, to describe the ways constitutional rights can intersect with rules of
evidence, and to propose how courts could more clearly and
consistently approach such difficult questions.
The Supreme Court has long sought to explain how it tries
to minimize conflict between constitutional rights and the complex and tradition-bound body of state and federal evidence
law. As Justice Robert H. Jackson colorfully and famously put
it, writing for the Court in Michelson v. United States: “To pull
one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more
likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.”2 Constitutional
rights that regulate civil and criminal procedure inevitably conflict with rules that govern what evidence can be admissible at
a trial. The Court often justifies abstinence from questions of
evidence by noting that it is poorly situated, given the posture
at which cases come before it, to regulate trial evidence. As the
Court has put it, “the Due Process Clause does not permit the
federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom
of state evidentiary rules.”3
1
This is despite the fact that, as Professor Mitchell Berman has advanced,
constitutional scholars increasingly examine metadoctrine, or how constitutional
rules or “decision rules” interact with and result in remedies. Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004). Rules of evidence
deeply affect the practical resolution of constitutional rules and, conversely, while
constitutional rights affecting evidence, such as the Miranda right, can be seen as
“decision rules,” id. at 115–16, I argue that such constitutional questions can be
better understood as the application of a constitutional standard to a question of
evidence. For discussion of how to understand rights like the Miranda right under
this view of constitutional evidence law, see infra Section II.B.2.
2
335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
3
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983).
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More recently, in Perry v. New Hampshire, the Court distanced itself from due process reliability-related concerns with
eyewitness-identification evidence and stated that rules of evidence could suffice to regulate any such problems.4 In a recent
Confrontation Clause decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented, arguing the Court should not so lightly “sweep[ ] away
an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence.”5 The Court cited this language approvingly in the majority opinion in Williams v. Illinois,6 in which Justice Clarence
Thomas concurred, but countered, “I do not think that rules of
evidence should so easily trump a defendant’s confrontation
right,” and Justice Elena Kagan in turn dissented, calling the
result “abdication to state-law labels.”7 The inconsistent views
expressed by the Justices in such opinions highlight the importance of the problem. Moreover, the reasoning regarding what I
characterize as conflicts between evidence law and constitutional law is quite distinct from that in areas in which scholars
have more generally observed “underenforced constitutional
norms.”8 In this Article, I argue that when and whether constitutional rights demand evidentiary outcomes are distinct
problems lacking adequate guidance. The Court and lower
state and federal courts cannot so easily avoid engaging with
the content and purposes of evidence rules when interpreting
constitutional rights, and nor should they.
Indeed, the Supreme Court sometimes throws caution to
the wind when Justices proclaim a contrary intent to displace
evidence law outright. If anything, the Court has become more
open over time to interpreting constitutional rights in a way
that displaces traditional or statutory rules of evidence. By
rules of evidence, I refer throughout not only to common-law
and statutory exclusionary rules that operate at a trial but
also, and more broadly, to the rules surrounding preservation
of privilege pretrial and other aspects of trial practice that regulate evidence, such as jury instructions that explain evidence
to the factfinder.9 The Warren Court’s criminal procedure
4
132 S. Ct. 716, 729 (2012) (stating that rules of evidence, expert testimony,
and jury instructions provide “safeguards” of reliability of eyewitness evidence).
5
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
6
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
7
Id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring).
8
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1978).
9
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried provides a useful definition of evidence
law as “the common-law and statutory exclusionary rules of evidence—rules such
as the hearsay and opinion doctrines, which operate to exclude logically relevant
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revolution is part of the reason the approach towards constitutionalizing evidence law changed; evidentiary rules were overturned as unconstitutionally denying a fundamentally fair
trial. The modern exclusionary rule is the most high-profile
example, in which evidence that might be quite reliable and
clearly admissible under state and federal evidence law, following the Court’s landmark ruling in Mapp v. Ohio, must sometimes be excluded under the Fourth Amendment.10 Similarly,
the Court long interpreted the Compulsory Process Clause to
accommodate evidentiary privileges, but beginning in the late
1960s, the Court changed course and found the Clause sometimes permits a criminal defendant the right to introduce evidence even in direct contravention of evidentiary privileges.11
That gradual process of recognizing that certain extreme applications of rules of evidence could result in an unfair trial was
displaced by the revolution that the Court’s 2004 decision
Crawford v. Washington heralded for the law of hearsay in
criminal cases.12 The Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
turned away from an approach accommodating traditional
hearsay rules and exceptions and instead adopted a constitutional test asking whether evidence is “testimonial” in nature,
which was drawn from common-law restrictions on out-ofcourt testimony. Rather than displacing rules of evidence due
to skepticism of the jury’s fact-finding ability, such rulings view
the constitutional right as a distinct “trump.”13
Yet in other areas, as noted, the Supreme Court has expressed real reluctance to regulate evidence law using the Constitution. As Professor Alex Stein has put it, constitutional law
has tended to supplant evidence law only “in extreme cases”
that exhibit “fundamental unfairness” implicating the Due Process Clause.14 However, that gloss does not sufficiently explain
evidence.” Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Pretrial Importance and Adaptation of the
“Trial” Evidence Rules, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 965 (1992).
10
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
11
See infra Subpart III.B.
12
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty.”).
13
See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A
View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1201–02 (1996) (attributing
the birth of the modern law of evidence in the eighteenth century to the rise of the
adversarial criminal trial, which created a need to control the evidence that was
presented to juries); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 166 n.5 (2006) (describing the broad
scholarly debates over which view animates evidence law).
14
Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 66 (2008); see
also id. at 124 (“The Court therefore avoids telling state courts and legislators how
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all of the Court’s due process rulings nor rulings regarding
other rights, such as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
or the Confrontation Clause. I conclude in Part I by exploring
what rationales courts give when declining to regulate evidence
law.
In Part II, I describe a deeper connection between constitutional rights and evidence law. I argue that it is doubtful that
any constitutional right that relates to the civil or criminal trial
process can succeed in either ignoring or creating a clean break
with the body of evidence law. This either/or approach explains, in my view, why scholars on both sides of the decadeslong debates have misunderstood the Miranda right, viewing it
as an outlier because the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth
Amendment to require out-of-court provision of warnings by
police with in-court evidentiary consequences.15 Scholars have
tried to categorize Miranda as constitutional common law,16 or
subconstitutional,17 or a decision rule versus a remedy.18 Instead, I argue that Miranda is simply an example of constitutional evidence law, in which the Constitution regulates a
question of evidence (the admissibility of compelled statements
by a criminal suspect) and must therefore develop the meaning
of the constitutional right in the context of the standard fare of
evidentiary privileges and rules (including rules for waiver and
preservation of privilege) in order to give the right adequate
effect.
Nor is Miranda exceptional. I explore in Part II how in a
host of areas the Court has tried to moderate the impact of
constitutional rights by creating interpretations and exceptions
that at times take careful account of evidentiary concerns. Although I argue that when constitutional law and evidence law
intersect an explicit intersectional analysis is necessary, the
analysis can be quite challenging. The complex post-Crawford
case law suggests how replacing the existing rules of evidence
to design and apply their evidence rules. Yet for extreme deviations from its vision
of due process, the Court retains a residual power to interfere.”).
15
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–74 (1966).
16
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975).
17
Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 43
(2001); Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible “Prophylactic” Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299,
300 (1996); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
190, 195 (1988). Dickerson v. United States put to rest that possible interpretation of Miranda. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
18
Berman, supra note 1, at 127.

R
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with a brand new constitutional test can raise difficult new
problems.19 Similarly, the Supreme Court has sought to constrain civil punitive damages awards under the Due Process
Clause, using factors designed for use on appeal. Yet the Court
over time faced the need to engage more carefully with the
content of jury instructions and the evidence jurors hear.20
The Court has sometimes come back around from its posture of
abstinence from evidence law by later interpreting rights to try
to minimize impact on evidence law. The Court has tried to
mitigate the impact of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule by crafting an ever-increasing set of exceptions that are
not reliability based.21 I highlight the case of eyewitness identifications, in which the due process rule permits trial judges to
excuse a violation based on an ostensibly evidentiary analysis.
Drawing on some form of evidence law was salutary. Unfortunately, the example provides a cautionary tale as well. The
content of the Court’s due process test itself provides trial
judges largely unfettered discretion whether to admit eyewitness identifications for reasons that bear little on the reliability
of an eyewitness and that have been criticized by the scientific
community as so flawed that the test should be jettisoned.22
In Part III, I argue that abstinence is not the best policy,
nor is it feasible. Constitutional interpretation may often call
for rules that affect what evidence can or cannot be used in
court. Instead, the Court should explicitly consider whether a
constitutional rule regulating official conduct also requires evidentiary directions regarding what types of proof of violations
are appropriate. Even when, as sometimes may be appropriate, a court interprets constitutional rights to displace traditional evidence law, the Court should still explain and engage
with the sources of conflict in order to minimize potential confusion in the lower courts. Evidence law presents a particularly complex problem of what Professor Doni Gewirtzman has
called “lower court constitutionalism.”23 I argue that a court
can and should clearly address sources of conflict with a constitutional rule, address what evidentiary use that rule should
be put to, set out what the state of the evidence rule is and the
values underlying it, and only then decide whether the
19

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
21
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (recognizing
“good faith” exception to exclusionary rule).
22
See infra Section I.B.1.
23
Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in
a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 481–89 (2012).
20
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evidence-law rule deserves any degree of deference. Standard
rules of constitutional avoidance are not warranted in an area
in which evidence rules are not chiefly the product of statute.
Instead, careful consideration of the effect of constitutional
rules on evidentiary practice is warranted. Current federal and
state evidence rules may have an integrity and structure that
courts should not always tamper with, as Professor Fred
Schauer has argued.24 At the same time, many evidence-law
rules are notoriously lacking in empirical support and
outdated.25
Evidence law did not radically change over the past century, while constitutional law has. Now evidence rules may be
playing catch-up and taking more rapid account of evolving
scientific research than constitutional doctrine can. Some variation in pretrial and trial practice, if not outright conflict, is
inevitable as constitutional rulings filter down to lower courts.
In some areas, either displacing or updating evidence law and
trial practice is highly desirable. Despite an oft-stated avoidance of interfering with the body of evidence law and accompanying trial and pretrial practice, some of it warranted and some
not, I conclude in Part III by describing different ways that
federal and state courts can interpret constitutional rights to
add value to evidence law without creating unintended confusion. A more detailed understanding of the core evidentiary
concerns of the constitutional right and whether or not they are
compatible with evidence law could advance the doctrine. The
U.S. Supreme Court’s role is far clearer when interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence that apply uniformly to all federal courts
(and that have been adopted by many state courts). As a result, rulings like the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
ruling guiding a judge’s task when weighing admissibility of
expert evidence widely influence federal and state courts.26 In
contrast, constitutional-law rulings using terms and standards
outside of evidence law pose greater risks for conflict and confusion in doctrine and practice.
This Article supplies both cautionary tales and positive encouragement. Constitutional rules may create rules of decision
but they can also create rules of evidence. When they do so, it
should be intentional and the relationship between constitu24

Schauer, supra note 13, at 194–95.
Samuel R. Gross, Law in the Backwaters: A Comment on Mirjan Damas̆ka’s
Evidence Law Adrift, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 370 (1998) (“Trial practice, and evidence law in particular . . . have changed far less in this century than the procedural and substantive legal framework that surrounds them.”).
26
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
25

R
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tional law and evidence law carefully explained. Conversely,
evidence rules can under-enforce constitutional norms. Getting the connection between constitutional law and the law of
evidence right has great importance, and neglect of this problem has not only led to misunderstanding of the status of doctrines like the Miranda doctrine but real confusion in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, punitive damages jurisprudence, and longstanding neglect of values like accuracy in
criminal procedure, where evidence-law concerns with reliability could better inform constitutional values. Judicial adoption
of the proposed set of standards for adjudicating conflicts may
improve both the quality of evidence law and litigation outcomes but also the care with which constitutional rights are
enforced in the lower courts.
I
EVIDENCE-LAW CONFLICT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Justice Jackson, writing for the Supreme Court, put the
problem of the Court’s role in relation to the law of evidence
well in Michelson v. United States in 1948, describing the particular issue in the case regarding the use of a criminal defendant’s good character evidence as follows:
The law of evidence relating to proof of reputation in criminal
cases has developed almost entirely at the hands of state
courts of last resort, which have such questions frequently
before them. This Court, on the other hand, has contributed
little to this or to any phase of the law of evidence, for the
reason, among others, that it has had extremely rare occasion to decide such issues, as the paucity of citations in this
opinion to our own writings attests. It is obvious that a court
which can make only infrequent sallies into the field cannot
recast the body of case law on this subject in many, many
years, even if it were clear what the rules should be.27

And in rejecting the proposed rule regarding cross-examination
about a defendant’s prior arrests, the Court added: “The confusion and error it would engender would seem too heavy a price
to pay for an almost imperceptible logical improvement, if any,
in a system which is justified, if at all, by accumulated judicial
experience rather than abstract logic.”28
Perhaps without intending to do so, the Supreme Court’s
ruling did affect trial practice. A casual phrase in Justice
Jackson’s majority opinion noted that, in line with its prior
27
28

335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
Id. at 487.
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holding in Edgington, good character evidence “is sometimes
valuable to the defendant” because it “may be enough to raise a
reasonable doubt of guilt and that in the federal courts a jury in
a proper case should be so instructed.”29 Lower courts then
had to discuss, and some rejected, the proposition that a jury
should be specially charged that good character evidence can
“alone” generate reasonable doubt in a criminal case.30 Some
trial judges gave that instruction, and some courts, such as the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, endorsed “hybrid” charges
using the “standing alone” language and noting that character
evidence be considered along with other evidence.31 Pattern
jury instruction books included jury instructions based on that
reference in Michelson.32
As a result, a decision taking great pains to state an intent
to avoid interference with the “grotesque structure” of traditional evidence law instead led lower courts and drafters of
pattern jury instructions to seize on isolated dicta concerning
the possible value of good character evidence and the use of
“potentially misleading and confusing” jury charges.33
More broadly, the Supreme Court’s decision, in making
still additional statements concerning the particular good character evidence in the case, endorsed what Professor David
Sklansky points out is “the bizarre practice of impeaching a
defendant’s character witnesses by asking whether they have
heard rumors about the defendant that are never shown to be
29
Id. at 484; see also Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366 (1896)
(noting “good character” in the right circumstances could “alone create a reasonable doubt”).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“[N]either Edgington nor Michelson compels an instruction telling the jury that
character evidence ‘standing alone’ may create a reasonable doubt.”).
31
Id. at 31. However, the court noted that while it might not be an abuse of
discretion to provide such an instruction, “not only does such a hybrid charge not
cure the problems of the ‘standing alone’ charge, it may add to them. A charge
telling the jury to consider character evidence both alone and together with all the
other evidence is inherently confusing and contradictory.” Id.
32
See id. (noting that “several frequently used pattern jury instruction books”
contain charges using the “standing alone” language) (citing 1 L. SAND, J. SIFFERT,
W. LOUGHLIN & S. REISS, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 5–33 (1991)
(Instruction 5-15)).
33
Id. at 32. For the general point that Michelson “roundly lambasts the
‘common law tradition’ governing character proof while upholding it in the end,”
see Daniel D. Blinka, Character, Liberalism, and the Protean Culture of Evidence
Law, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 87, 138 (2013). While several federal courts adopted
the “standing alone” instruction, apparently “judicial dissatisfaction with the illogic of that approach appears to have won the day in federal courts, and at
present, none of the 12 federal circuit courts of appeals requires a ‘standing alone’
instruction . . . .” 3 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 16:26 (7th ed. 2013).
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true—or even proven to be actual rumors,” by saying that limiting instructions might cure the defect, even if, as Justice Jackson acknowledged, the trial judge’s instructions were “almost
unintelligible.”34 Why the Court needed to do that, when ostensibly adhering to established character evidence law, raises
still more questions about the case and the larger problem of
decisions that have an unintended impact on the law of
evidence.
That experience alone, in the wake of the very Supreme
Court decision, perhaps due to Justice Jackson’s characteristic eloquence, that more than any other is cited for the proposition that the Court should steer clear of unnecessary changes
to evidence law, suggests the pitfalls of such engagement and
the potential for perverse and unintended outcomes without
adopting a clear approach to such questions. To be sure, the
Michelson case did not involve a constitutional rule coming into
conflict with a rule of evidence. One would expect that a constitutional rule would more routinely “trump” any conflicting evidentiary rules.
In the decades that followed, the Court would embark on a
range of projects, following the incorporation of much of the Bill
of Rights as against the States, that would bring constitutional
criminal procedure rights in particular but also some civil
rights, into sharp conflict with rules of evidence. The same
concerns with upsetting the edifice of evidence-law rules and
remedies would apply, but with the countervailing concern that
constitutional rights be vindicated and with still additional federalism concerns, when varying state law of evidence might
come into conflict with federal constitutional rights. Over time,
the Court became more and more willing to interpret constitutional rights in a way that regulated evidence in ways that
sharply differed from the traditional way that evidence had
been handled. As noted, scholars have, when they have commented on such rulings, characterized the Court as largely
avoiding regulation of state evidence law, with the Due Process
Clause largely confined to preventing extreme and fundamental unfairness; in particular, the Court has been leery of regulating the reliability of evidence, even in criminal cases in which
claims of innocence are raised.35
34
David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65
STAN. L. REV. 407, 447–48 (2013) (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 485 (1948)).
35
See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407–08 (1993) (“[B]ecause the
States have considerable expertise in matters of criminal procedure . . . we have
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However, scholars have not examined the general problem
of what a court should do when properly confronted with an
outright or potential conflict between the outcome under an
evidentiary rule and a constitutional right (as is often the case,
evidentiary objections are frequently unpreserved or found
harmless by the time they reach appellate courts). There are
two basic outcomes that could result. The constitutional right
could be interpreted as not applying and the evidence rule
could apply as it ordinarily would, permitting or barring introduction of the relevant piece of evidence. Or the constitutional
right could trump evidence law, leading to a different outcome
than would otherwise result.
What explains the circumstances when the constitutional
right trumps or not? It is not immediately apparent. One
might expect that constitutional rights would always trump
evidence law, whether state or federal, since constitutional law
is authority of the highest order. And that sometimes occurs,
as described in the subpart that follows. Prominent examples
include recent Confrontation Clause rulings, the exclusionary
rule, Fifth Amendment rulings, and Compulsory Process
Clause rulings, in which the constitutional right displaced
longstanding evidence law. And yet this body of constitutional
evidence law should be understood alongside the body of areas
in which the Court has declined to displace longstanding evidence law. In the next subpart, I will turn to those cases.
A. Constitutional Law Trumping Evidence Law
While the Court often defines its reasons for abstinence in
terms of federalism, comity, and finality, the Court’s approach
has been far more complex, both inside and outside its due
process jurisprudence. This subpart describes the major examples of the Court displacing evidence law, as well as examples of the Court deferring to evidence law, in order to contrast
the two opposite outcomes and begin to understand as a descriptive matter what explains the opposing approaches. The
Parts that follow will then examine these outcomes more critically and offer an alternative framework to govern constitutional and evidence-law intersections.

‘exercis[ed] substantial deference to legislative judgments in this area.’” (quoting
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1992))).
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1. The Confrontation Clause
The Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence over the past few decades has been nothing short of a
revolution. The Court abandoned earlier reliance on evidencelaw concepts and instead adopted a constitutional-specific test
that results in outcomes quite different than if the traditional
evidence-law rules applied. The rejection of evidence law could
not have been more dramatic; in its intent, at least, the lower
courts predicted that the Court had worked a “sea change,” a
“paradigm shift,” or a “Copernican shift.”36
The Court’s earlier Confrontation Clause approach had
emphasized that out-of-court statements could be admitted if
there were “indicia of reliability,”37 based on the circumstances, or if the evidence fell within a particular hearsay exception.38 The approach accommodated evidence-law rules
within the constitutional framework. As the Court put it in
Ohio v. Roberts, one reason why not all witnesses must be
produced at trial is that “every jurisdiction has a strong interest
in effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal
proceedings.”39 The Court cited deference to local development
of the rules of evidence as a reason not to superimpose inflexible constitutional rules requiring confrontation in all circumstances. The Court adopted a constitutional rule in deference
to state and federal evidence rules rather than displacing them.
Further, the Supreme Court recognized common interests
between the two bodies of constitutional and evidence law:
“[H]earsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally
designed to protect similar values.”40 The Court noted that its
approach, “[t]rue to the common-law tradition, . . . has been
gradual, building on past decisions, drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions.”41 That is not to
say that the Court always reflexively deferred to state evidence36
Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After Crawford: The Decision’s Impact on
How Hearsay Is Analyzed Under the Confrontation Clause, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
327, 329–30 (2006) (citations omitted).
37
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
38
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that “[r]eliability can
be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception” or where it bears “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness”).
39
Id. at 64; see also Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the
Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 201 (2004) (criticizing this justification).
40
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
41
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
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law rules. Over time, the Court found that conflicts that
threatened the fairness of trials in a fundamental way led to the
Confrontation Clause trumping state law. In Davis v. Alaska,
for example, despite noting sound reasons to protect the privacy of juvenile offenders, the Court had concluded that “[i]n
this setting . . . the right of confrontation is paramount to the
State’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender.”42 However, the
approach, as the Court correctly described it, was incremental.
The Supreme Court abandoned that evidence-law informed
and case-by-case approach in its revolutionary opinion in
Crawford v. Washington. As the Court explained in its opinion
in Crawford, “[l]eaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence” renders “the Confrontation
Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”43 The Court added: “[W]e once again reject the
view that the Confrontation Clause[’s] . . . application to out-ofcourt statements . . . depends upon ‘the law of Evidence for the
time being.’”44 Instead, the Court ruled that absent a prior
opportunity for cross-examination, if the witness is available at
the time of trial, a statement that is “testimonial” and offered
for the truth of the matter asserted, the statement is barred
from trial if the witness is not produced for defense confrontation at a criminal trial.45 In adopting this test, the Court rejected the approach it had adhered to in prior decades relying
on reliability, emphasizing: “[W]e do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’”46 The Court criticized the use of “countless factors
bearing on whether a statement is reliable.”47 The Court, in the
majority opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, instead
emphasized the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause
at the time of its adoption, a view that the Clause codified a
common-law approach towards out-of-court statements by witnesses, and the Court emphasized its text, focusing on “witnesses” who “bear testimony.”48 Thus, rather than
accommodating evolving law of hearsay, the Court adopted an
42

415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
44
Id. at 50–51 (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1397, at 101 (2d ed.
1923)).
45
Id. at 68.
46
Id. at 61.
47
Id. at 63.
48
Id. at 51–56.
43
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approach in which the Clause reflected an understanding,
right or wrong, of the common-law rules for out-of-court
statements.49
The test the Court adopted can be compared, as discussed
later in the next Part, with the Court’s embrace of a
multifactored concept of reliability in the area of eyewitnessidentification evidence, for example, and with a more equivocal
use of reliability in the law of confessions. However, one area
where the Court similarly rejected current evidence law as a
source, and viewed the constitutional right as trumping reliability (at least initially), is the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule, perhaps the best-known and most significant piece of
constitutional evidence law of all. Nor can the different approaches be so readily explained by differences in constitutional text or original meaning. Moreover, the relationship
between originalist interpretation and reliance on practical
considerations has become more complex in the decisions that
have followed Crawford.50 As discussed in the next Part, the
post-Crawford cases have departed farther from any grounding
in original meaning, and have instead engaged with current
evidence rules and developed constitutional evidence-law principles accommodating and explaining the intersection between
a Confrontation Clause rule focusing on “testimonial” evidence
and evidence-law rules and process.
2. The Exclusionary Rule
The Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule,
adopted to make more effective the Fourth Amendments right
of citizens to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,”51 bars
the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, as well as the evidentiary fruits of illegally seized
evidence.52 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court incorporated that exclusionary rule, which had been adopted as a matter of federal
49
See David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation and Kabuki, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 501,
515 (2012) (describing the relationship between originalist arguments in the
Court’s recent Confrontation Clause decisions and more pragmatic
considerations).
50
For an elegant analysis of the growing tension between the originalist and
pragmatic strains in this growing body of law, see generally Sklansky, supra note
49.
51
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).

R
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evidence law for many decades, as against the states.53 The
Court announced: “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”54 The rule announced in
Mapp, a case that involved egregious police misconduct, was
intended primarily to “[d]eter future unlawful police conduct”
and provide a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally,” rather than to provide a
rule of evidence in criminal cases.55 The rule does, however,
alter the operation of evidentiary rules by creating a constitutional bar on the admissibility of evidence that would otherwise
be admissible (and potentially highly probative of guilt) in criminal cases.
Far from reflecting traditional evidence-law concerns, such
as relevance or reliability, the Court has noted that the exclusionary rule “almost always requires courts to ignore reliable,
trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence.”56 The
Fourth Amendment had previously been treated as not resulting in an evidentiary remedy at all; prior to Mapp, a state official’s violation of the Fourth Amendment might result in a civil
damages claim but not a bar on introduction of evidence in a
criminal case in state court.57 As Chief Justice William Howard
Taft put it in Olmstead v. United States, describing the adoption
of the exclusionary rule in federal court: “Theretofore many had
supposed that under the ordinary common law rules, if the
tendered evidence was pertinent, the method of obtaining it
was unimportant.”58 A Fourth Amendment violation had no
evidentiary consequences. Moreover, constitutional text did
not demand an exclusionary result. It was “striking” that as a
result of Mapp “the Fourth Amendment, although not referring
to or limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its
introduction.”59 The Fourth Amendment regulates the admis53
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
54
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
55
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974). As Justice Lewis
Powell later put it, the exclusionary rule does not provide “a personal constitutional right,” and it was not designed to “redress the injury” of the Fourth Amendment violation. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). On the facts in Mapp,
see Corinna B. Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361,
1375–76 (2004).
56
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011).
57
See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31 (noting the availability of “remedies of private
action” in states that had not voluntarily adopted an exclusionary rule).
58
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462–63 (1928).
59
Id. at 462.
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sibility of evidence, in conflict with prior law of evidence, and
despite no constitutional text requiring an evidentiary remedy.
To be sure, the dramatic extension of the exclusionary rule
to the states in Mapp was just the beginning of the story and
not the end. In the decades since, the Supreme Court has
created a range of exceptions to the exclusionary rule; recent
rulings cite to exceptions involving good faith mistakes by police and emphasize as paramount concerns with excluding reliable evidence of guilt.60 The next Part will take up the reasons
why the Court has backtracked from or moderated the impact
of its decisions on evidentiary outcomes, depending on one’s
point of view, to use constitutional exclusionary rules to displace evidence rules. Those rulings help to fill out the picture
in a way that the initially binary story described in this Part
(either the constitutional rule trumps or it does not) fails to
capture.
3. Punitive Damages
One might respond to the prior examples with the concern
that perhaps the exclusionary rule is something of an exception, but that in general the Supreme Court might tend to be
more willing to regulate evidence law in the context of constitutional rights that are more explicitly, based on their text, evidence focused (like the Confrontation Clause, or like Fifth
Amendment privilege, discussed next). However, a range of
due process rulings have taken the same form explicitly regulating evidence law, even though the due process clause has
language that could not be more general or susceptible to varied applications. To be sure, the phrase “due process of law”
clearly refers to deprivations that are the result of a judicial
process. However, the text does not necessarily require an evidentiary remedy to any such deprivation of life, liberty, or property through constitutionally inadequate judicial process. In
rulings discussed in the next Part, the Court has noted that it
disfavors over-regulation of evidence law using the Due Process
Clause, particularly in criminal cases. In general, as Professor
Alex Stein has described well, only “in extreme cases” in which
there is some “fundamental unfairness” does the Court inter60
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). The majority in Herring
rejected the dissent’s stated concerns with potential unreliability of law enforcement databases, and instead emphasized that the mistake in the warrant was due
to negligence and was an isolated error. Id. at 146–47.
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vene.61 And yet in civil litigation, the Court’s approach has
sometimes been quite different.
In early rulings concerning punitive damages verdicts, the
Court expressed great concern with the problem of excessive
and arbitrarily imposed punitive damages awards. However, in
those early rulings, the Court deferred to state judges’ instructions to jurors, approving in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip instructions that dissenters called “scarcely better than
no guidance at all,”62 while focusing in BMW of North America
v. Gore on “guideposts” to assess on appeal whether punitive
damages awards were excessive.63 The Court was not attempting to provide guidance on evidence law, that is, how to properly instruct jurors on the standard for whether to impose
punitive damages.
In more recent decisions in State Farm v. Campbell and
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Supreme Court has more
emphatically intervened in evidence law, cautioning that jurors
be instructed on not punishing defendants for out-of-state conduct or conduct harming nonparty victims. As the Court put it
in Philip Morris: “the Due Process Clause requires States to
provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question.”64 In Exxon Shipping v. Baker, Justice David Souter noted
that the Justices, having read examples of ill-defined state jury
instructions on punitive damages, have become “skeptical that
verbal formulations, superimposed on general jury instructions, are the best insurance against unpredictable outliers.”65
Justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting, asked why the Court
was authorized to impose specific caps or ratios, which are
“typically imposed by legislatures, not courts.”66
61
Stein, supra note 14, at 124 (“The Court therefore avoids telling state
courts and legislators how to design and apply their evidence rules. Yet for extreme deviations from its vision of due process, the Court retains a residual power
to interfere.”).
62
499 U.S. 1, 48 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
63
517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).
64
549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007). State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
provided guidance that jurors should be instructed that “out-of-state conduct”
should not be used as a basis for punitive damages. Id. at 422. The Philip Morris
ruling stated that it would be “standardless” and impermissible for a jury to
“permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim.” Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at
354; see also Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on
Punitive Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
423, 507–08 (2004); Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instruction on Punitive Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2
CHARLESTON L. REV. 307, 308 (2008).
65
554 U.S. 471, 504 (2008).
66
Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Whether the Supreme Court will continue to regulate jury
instructions in this area is an open question. But one way that
the Court might avoid doing what legislatures typically do to
regulate damages verdicts by statute is to instead turn to evidence law: to regulate jury instructions to provide clearer guidance to jurors considering punitive damages awards in the
first instance. An explicit recognition that this due process
punitive damages jurisprudence involves regulation of evidence
law would help to avoid the trap that the Court has seemingly
fallen into, appearing to regulate punitive damages by supplying damages caps that are typically imposed by legislatures, or
by applying appellate standards of review that are unfamiliar.
Instead, by regulating jury instructions more carefully, the
Court could use the Due Process Clause to do something that
involves a more familiar role for the courts: assuring that the
jury is instructed in a clear manner that reflects underlying
substantive law and any constitutional limitations on that law.
4. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment presents a clearer textual case for a
constitutional “trump” over traditional evidence law because it
adopts an evidentiary privilege, with the drafters having very
much in mind ensuring that individuals would not be required
to testify in court in a self-incriminating way against their will.
The Self-Incrimination Clause provides: “No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”67 The Fourth Amendment contains no such textual suggestion of an evidentiary privilege; as the Supreme Court has
put it, “[u]nlike the Fourth Amendment’s bar on unreasonable
searches, the Self-Incrimination Clause is self-executing.”68
That text, describing an evidentiary privilege at a criminal trial,
defines the right as a trump over any countervailing evidence
law.
However, the Supreme Court has also supplemented the
bare protection against being forced to testify at a criminal trial
by explaining the consequences of that privilege. It would not
be a particularly useful protection if it would simply bar forcing
a person to take the stand at trial against that person’s will, if a
person’s silence could be used to impeach them at a criminal
trial, or if earlier-coerced statements during interrogations by
police could substitute for testimony on the stand (unless, as
67
68

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004).
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the Supreme Court has elaborated, such use is immunized).69
A complex body of Fifth Amendment law regulates subjects
that flow from the complex evidentiary situations in which the
question whether a person’s self-incriminating remarks may be
admissible, such as, for example, the question of the voluntariness of earlier police interrogations; whether police must give
warnings regarding self-incrimination rights and rights to
counsel under Miranda v. Arizona when a suspect is in police
custody;70 rules to evaluate the voluntariness of juvenile
waiver;71 the impeachment uses of post-arrest silence at subsequent proceedings;72 and the circumstances in which individuals can refuse to testify at noncriminal proceedings where
a subsequent criminal proceeding could occur.73 The intersection of the constitutional right and the surrounding law of evidence required a more complex intervention, developing over
time a body of constitutional evidence law that was an amalgam of the two.
This suggests a somewhat different understanding of the
purpose and the nature of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona.74 Commentators, until the Supreme Court
clarified that Miranda was constitutionally required, had asked
whether the Miranda warnings were subconstitutional rules, or
constitutional common law, designed to protect the constitutional right but not required by the constitution and perhaps
the types of rules that federal legislation could displace.75 If so,
Miranda would be a type of evidentiary rule generated to protect a constitutional right but one that state or federal legislators could replace with alternative mechanisms. The Supreme
Court in Dickerson v. United States, however, held that the rule
is constitutional.76 That ruling may have settled the constitutional status of the rule but it did not explain the connection
between the right against compelled self-incrimination and the
warnings.
In my view, the status of the rule was always constitutional, and it was the wrong question to ask whether it was a
69

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458 (1972).
384 U.S. 436, 467–71(1966).
71
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011).
72
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
73
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 458.
74
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
75
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–23 (1975) (characterizing
Miranda as constitutional common law).
76
530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
70
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remedy or a right, constitutional or subconstitutional. The rule
can instead be something more straightforward: an interpretation of a constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment, which necessarily regulates evidence. After all, a constitutional right that
creates a privilege in the courtroom is necessarily evidence focused, requiring a range, as described, of rules to explain its
operation, during pretrial and trial practice, regarding waiver,
invocation of the privilege, and remedies at trial. The notion
that a courtroom privilege would be accompanied by the need
to warn individuals of their privilege out of court, lest it be
waived before trial, is relevant in other Fifth Amendment contexts as well. For example, the government may compel testimony from witnesses, but only if it grants those witnesses
immunity or provides assurance that the witness is not a target
of the investigation.77 And in a range of contexts, the Court has
held that the government need not provide warnings, but the
individual seeking protection of the Fifth Amendment must
timely claim the privilege.78 Even when invoked, Fifth Amendment privilege may later be waived.79 Similarly, individuals are
notified when and whether attorney-client privilege applies,
and to prevent inadvertent waiver, they may invoke the privilege in civil proceedings80 or they may be compelled to testify in
civil proceedings only if the Government provides immunity.81
Such protections are seen as part and parcel of the self-incrimination right, since inadvertent or uninformed or even involuntary waiver might not be treated as a waiver in the courtroom:
as the Court has put it, “[t]he natural concern which underlies . . . these decisions is that an inability to protect the right at
one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at a
later stage.”82 Perhaps it should not be surprising that a constitutional right would require explanation in its application
across a range of potential evidentiary consequences, and perhaps there should not have been any doubt as to Miranda’s
constitutional footing.
77

Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976) (“[I]n the
ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead
of claiming the privilege, the government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate
himself.”); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951) (“If [the witness]
desired the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, she was required
to claim it.”).
79
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–87 (2010).
80
See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1998).
81
Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n., Inc. v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280, 282–84 (1968).
82
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 at 440–41 (1974).
78
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Some criminal procedure scholars, as opposed to constitutional scholars, have been more comfortable with the status of
Miranda since, as Professor Susan Klein puts it well,
“[c]onstitutional criminal procedure is rife with prophylactic
rules.”83 Professor David Strauss more broadly describes how
“ubiquit[ous]” and “necessary” prophylactic rules are throughout constitutional law when burdens of presumption or standards of review are elaborated by courts.84 Detailed rules of
operation are particularly necessary to explain how an evidentiary rule functions at each stage of the litigation process. In
the area of constitutional evidence law, one would particularly
expect the need for the Supreme Court to elaborate rules required to adequately protect and implement the constitutional
right. That is why criminal procedure settings, such as the
Fifth Amendment, are particularly “rife” with what looks like
prophylactic rules only if one is not accustomed to seeing rules
elaborated in the evidentiary context, in which the rule must
extend to what results when waivers are not provided, when
rights are not invoked during questioning, when invoked rights
may later be waived, when impeachment uses are anticipated,
and the like. Constitutional law necessarily looks different
when it engages with evidence law, and not because it is something less than fully constitutional.
B. Evidence Law Displacing Constitutional Rights
What do we make, then, of the situations in which, despite
serious reliability concerns, the Supreme Court refuses to interfere with state evidence law and permits unreliable evidence
to be introduced? What if state evidence law is inadequate?
More problematic, what if state evidence law is potentially inadequately protective of a constitutional right? Despite tension
with a constitutional right, there are important rulings in
which federal courts do not permit a constitutional right to
“trump” evidence law. Some rulings have already been discussed and they preceded more recent decisions taking the
83
Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1030, 1037 (2001); see also Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of
“Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001) (“[T]here really isn’t any such
thing as a distinctively prophylactic rule that is in any important way distinguishable from the more run-of-the-mill doctrine that courts routinely establish and
implement regarding every constitutional norm.”).
84
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190,
190 (1988) (“‘[P]rophylactic’ rules are not exceptional measures of questionable
legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law.”).
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opposite tack. Earlier Fourth Amendment rulings did not recognize an exclusionary rule where state officials violated the
Fourth Amendment,85 and earlier Confrontation Clause rulings
explicitly deferred to state evidence law regarding hearsay.86 In
those areas, the Court later reconsidered its approach. In still
additional areas, the Court continues to defer to state evidence
law rules.
1. State Action and Perry v. New Hampshire
In its recent decision in Perry v. New Hampshire, the
Supreme Court found that an eyewitness identification would
not be regulated under the Due Process Clause but rather
solely by any applicable state evidentiary rules.87 In that case,
the police officers had ostensibly not intended to conduct an
identification procedure. Where the officers had not “arrange[d]” nor orchestrated the procedure, the Court ruled that
without intentional state action, the Due Process Clause did
not apply.88 The Court noted that “potential unreliability” does
not necessarily require due process regulation.89 While the
Court had in its earlier decisions focused on reliability to avoid
the “automatic exclusion” of potentially “reliable and relevant”
evidence to avoid the result “on occasion, in the guilty going
free,”90 where the evidence might be highly unreliable, in Perry,
the Court now distanced itself from reliability-related concerns.91 The Court noted that state evidence law could suffice
to regulate any reliability problem.92 After all, a primary aim of
the due process doctrine is to deter “improper police conduct”
and not simply to regulate evidence law; the “due process
check for reliability” only “comes into play after the defendant
establishes improper police conduct.”93 The deterrence rationale is similar to that animating more recent Fourth Amendment doctrine discussed in the next Part. In contrast, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor in a solo dissent emphasized evidentiary reliability goals standing alone: the “vast body of scientific litera85
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of [state] officials.”).
86
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
87
132 S. Ct. 716, 729–30 (2012).
88
Id. at 725, 721.
89
Id. at 728.
90
Id. at 724 (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
Id. at 729.
92
Id. (noting state evidence rules, expert testimony, and jury instructions
provide important “safeguards” of the reliability of eyewitness evidence).
93
Id. at 726.
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ture” supporting the need to safeguard reliability under the
Due Process Clause.94
In such decisions, apparently, reliability is single edged.
Reliability is a reason to limit granting due process relief despite
the presence of a constitutional violation, but reliability is not
itself a reason to support a grant of due process relief to the
potentially innocent. If reliability really means “don’t ever potentially let the guilty go free,” and not “improve accuracy to
potentially free the innocent as well as convict the guilty,” then
reliability is not a particularly carefully considered concept in
constitutional evidence law. The situation in which the Court
defers to state evidentiary concerns extends to a broader set of
due process rulings, including in areas in which not reliability
but other considerations played a greater role.
2. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause, in all of its breadth, affects a wide
range of evidentiary matters in both civil and criminal trials,
and there is no one constant approach toward such questions.
Broadly speaking, in civil cases, procedural due process rulings safeguard some minimal ability to present evidence and
confront opposing evidence, depending on the circumstances
and stakes.95 In criminal cases, due process protects a more
traditional notion of fundamentally fair process. Does the right
to a “day in court” include the right to present evidence, despite
state evidence law to the contrary? As we have seen in a range
of areas so far, the answers vary, with no general theory to
address the problem.
In one line of decisions, however, the Supreme Court did
try to articulate a theory for when and whether constitutional
law might defer to evidence law, and that was in a particular
area related to the introduction of evidence of prior convictions.
In Marshall v. Lonberger, the defendant challenged the introduction of a prior conviction, not at sentencing but at the guilt
phase of his trial.96 The judge provided the jury with a limiting
instruction to consider the evidence of the conviction only for
the purpose of determining whether the conviction was valid
and whether the defendant was therefore guilty of an aggra94

Id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976) (modifying test to
focus on balancing the costs and benefits of procedure); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (“In almost every setting where important decisions turn on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses.”).
96
459 U.S. 422, 426 (1983).
95
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vated offense.97 The defendant argued that because he had
unintelligently waived his right to trial in the previous case, the
conviction was invalid, and its introduction at trial violated his
due process rights.98 In upholding the defendant’s conviction,
the Court reaffirmed its decision in Spencer v. Texas, which
rejected the claim that the Due Process Clause should bar the
introduction of prior convictions under a state habitual offender statute. The “[state] procedural rules [in Spencer] permitting introduction of the defendant’s prior conviction did not
pose a sufficient danger of unfairness to the defendant to offend the Due Process Clause,” the Lonberger Court explained,
“in part because such evidence was accompanied by instructions limiting the jury’s use of the conviction to sentence enhancement.”99 More broadly, as the Court put it, “the Due
Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in
a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary
rules.”100
Under the approach adopted in Spencer, the Supreme
Court sought to avoid the need to “make inroads into this entire complex code of state criminal evidentiary law”101 unless
the state law ran directly afoul of a constitutional right. The
Court also noted that a more “specific” constitutional right violation might result in a different outcome; for example, if the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was implicated, the result might be different.102 Or, an unconstitutional prior conviction (for example, a conviction of a crime
itself declared unconstitutional) would raise very different issues of greater constitutional concern, the Court implied.103
Those rulings suggest a different principle for adjudicating
these conflicts: the collision between constitutional law and
evidence law must be more direct and “specific.” That set of
statements, while it could support a coherent “test” for deciding whether a constitutional right should displace evidence law
or not, has not been clearly followed in other areas. As dis97

Id. at 429.
Id.
99
Id. at 438 n.6.
100
Id.
101
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967).
102
See id. at 564–65 (“[In contrast to this case,] the emphasis [in Jackson v.
Denno, which invalidated a state law requiring juries to decide the voluntariness
of confessions,] was on protection of a specific constitutional right, and the Jackson procedure was designed as a specific remedy to ensure that an involuntary
confession was not in fact relied upon by the jury.” (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1965))).
103
Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 438 & n.6.
98
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cussed already, the Court has in the decades since equivocated
on how to approach such matters within rights and has not
adopted any test to resolve questions across different types of
constitutional rights. Further, as discussed in the next section, still other considerations animate the Supreme Court’s
rulings in this intersection between constitutional law and evidence law: (1) federalism, (2) finality, (3) institutional competence, (4) seriousness of the constitutional violation,
(5) deterrence, and (6) reliability. And these are just particularly salient values emphasized in the various constitutional
settings; different constitutional rights and evidence rules may
implicate still additional concerns. I will argue in Parts II and
III that such additional values should inform the calculus; the
question whether and how a constitutional right should affect
evidence law cannot be reduced to a question regarding the
specificity of the constitutional right. Certainly, some constitutional rights do not directly relate to trial litigation; they may
themselves be litigated at trial, but they do not regulate the
fairness or procedures used at trial. However, the specificity of
a constitutional right’s text, while it may provide a starting
place, does not answer the question how that text should affect
outcomes in relation to evidence-law rules. I will argue that the
intersection should require more complex consideration.
C. Concerns with Regulating Evidence Law
1. Federalism, Finality, and Institutional Competence
In general, the Supreme Court’s due process rulings are
restrained and avoid engaging with questions of the reliability
of trial evidence. The Court often repeats language along the
lines of what it said in Spencer v. Texas that: “It has never been
thought that [decisions under the Due Process Clause] establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of
state rules of criminal procedure.”104 Noting that the Court
shared similar concerns as were expressed in Michelson, the
Court added in Spencer, “To say the United States Constitution
is infringed simply because this type of evidence may be prejudicial and limiting instructions inadequate to vitiate prejudicial
effects, would make inroads into this entire complex code of
state criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other large
areas of trial jurisprudence.”105 One reason is institutional
competence. Evidence law may be developed over time by trial
104
105

Id. at 438 n.6 (quoting Spencer, 385 U.S. at 564) (alteration in original).
Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562.
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judges with experience in such matters. A related reason is
federalism, however, where evidence rules may reflect policy
preferences of states. In a range of contexts, as noted, the
Court has avoided extending the application of due process
analysis, noting that state evidence law should instead apply.106 Citing to Spencer, the Court in Marshall v. Lonberger
further explained, “[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit
the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the
wisdom of state evidentiary rules.”107
Developing the theme still further in Montana v. Egelhoff,
the Supreme Court noted that in criminal procedure, due to
federalism concerns, a state evidentiary rule (there a rule barring jury consideration of voluntary intoxication) must be examined based on whether it violates a “fundamental principle
of justice” by examining “historical practice” and the “commonlaw tradition” in place at the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, as well noting the lack of any newly established practice “sufficiently uniform and permanent” to be
deemed as fundamental.108
In addition to federalism, finality has long been one important reason for this tendency to value procedural compliance
over reliability in interpretation of constitutional criminal procedure rights. Issues of finality do not come into play at trial,
but regarding the question whether evidentiary lapses should
result in a do-over of that trial. The Supreme Court has long
emphasized, “[T]he trial is the paramount event for determining
106
See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 729 (2012) (noting that
state evidence rules, expert testimony, and jury instructions provide important
“safeguards” of the reliability of eyewitness evidence). In addition, the Due Process Clause ensures a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof at a criminal
trial. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). However, the due process standard for review of sufficiency of evidence after a conviction is quite deferential,
with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and
reversals are rare. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 326 (1979)
(describing how a reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that
supports conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively
appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of
the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution”).
107
Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 438 n.6.
108
518 U.S. 37, 43, 46, 51 (1996); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72
(1991) (“[O]ur habeas powers [do not] allow us to reverse McGuire’s conviction
[under the Due Process Clause] based on a belief that the trial judge incorrectly
interpreted the California Evidence Code.”); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 64–65
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Constitution does not in any way relieve
a defendant from compliance with ‘rules of procedure and evidence designed to
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.’”
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973))).
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the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”109 In part for reasons
of finality of criminal judgments, the Court has yet to recognize
a claim of “actual innocence” under the Due Process Clause,
only hypothetically assuming that a capital convict facing execution might raise such a claim based on some type of extremely persuasive showing.110 The Court declined to
recognize a freestanding due process right to obtain post-conviction DNA testing, a type of discovery that could improve
accuracy, as the Court acknowledged, preferring to defer to
state experimentation with legislation in the area, and avoiding
addressing evidentiary issues such as when access to such
evidence might be required, when preservation of evidence
would be required, and under what circumstances.111
In contrast, the Supreme Court has developed a range of
increasingly ornate doctrines, including harmless error rules
and prejudice requirements, that encourage if not permit federal judges to deny federal habeas relief to those perceived to be
reliably guilty, or at least where error is seen as insignificant in
light of the untainted evidence in the case.112 Federalizing
harmless error as a constitutional matter, and then adopting
less rights-protective harmless error rules for federal habeas
corpus all constituted another intervention into evidence law of
a different type: the standards for reviewing evidence on appeal
and post-conviction. The purpose of preserving finality, and
not reopening trials due to “minor” evidentiary or even consti109

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993).
Id. at 398, 417; see also Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence:
The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 135–37 (2005) (listing
lower-court cases taking different positions on Herrera); Brandon L. Garrett,
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 110–12 (2008) (noting that, in an
empirical study of 133 convicts who were later exonerated by DNA evidence, five
had asserted actual innocence claims under Herrera, and none were granted
relief).
111
Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009) (acknowledging
that “DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty” but expressing reluctance to “take the development of rules and procedures in this area out of the hands of legislatures and
state courts shaping policy in a focused manner”); see also Brandon L. Garrett,
DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2925–35 (2010) (discussing the
Osborne decision in detail).
112
See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) (ruling that
the harmless error standard to be used during federal habeas corpus review
would be a more deferential “prejudice” test); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1692–98 (2008) (discussing how the availability of DNA evidence should impact federal habeas review). In some areas, in
contrast, the Court has found limiting instructions inadequate to protect against
constitutional violations. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 162
(1968).
110
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tutional violations, may also explain reluctance to over-regulate evidence.
2. Deterrence and Seriousness of the Rights Violation
The exclusionary rule, as discussed in the next Part, has
been substantially limited in a complex mass of rulings due to
a Supreme Court concern that officers need not be over-deterred, including when they “acted in good faith” when, for
example, relying on a search warrant.113 The Perry ruling provides another example, adopting a deterrence rationale in not
regulating lineups absent “improper conduct” by police. The
case of destruction of evidence is a similar example of this
approach, relying on notions of fault to prevent undue interference with law enforcement officers. In Arizona v. Youngblood,
the Court held that even reckless destruction of evidence does
not violate due process or require an adverse evidentiary inference against the state.114 Only intentional destruction of evidence would do: fault was the trigger for interference with
traditional rules of evidence.115
In other circumstances, it is a weighing of the totality of the
evidence in a case that triggers a constitutional concern and
makes an intervention in evidence law justified. The constitutional violation must be sufficiently “serious” to justify upsetting the standard operation of state evidence rules. The
Supreme Court forbids a state to deny funding for experts to an
indigent defendant, but only if the expert would testify as to a
sufficiently “significant” aspect of the defense case, adopting a
cost-benefit analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge.116 Other cases
like Chambers v. Mississippi, in which the Court found that a
“mechanistic[ ]” application of the hearsay rule fundamentally
impaired the defense,117 and Crane v. Kentucky, in which evidence of the circumstances of a confession were excluded, are
examples of rulings where the Court found due process violated where evidence “central to the defendant’s claim of innocence” was excluded at trial.118 But in general, as Professor
113

United States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (citations omitted).
488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (“[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith
on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.”).
115
Id.
116
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–83 (1985).
117
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt
are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the
ends of justice.”).
118
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
114
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Alex Stein has noted, constitutional law tends to supplant evidence law only “in extreme cases” that exhibit “fundamental
unfairness” implicating the Due Process Clause (or other constitutional provisions).119 As the Court has put it, “the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect
one.”120
3. Reliability
As critics of this aspect of the Supreme Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence have pointed out, myself included,
accuracy and reliability concerns are not of primary importance in constitutional criminal procedure generally.121 Fair
trial jurisprudence more heavily relies upon tradition-bound
due process notions of “fundamental fairness.” Few criminal
procedure rights attempt to ensure that the jury hears accurate and reliable evidence; they chiefly focus on deterring constitutional violations by state actors, or they aim to prevent
extreme unfairness or arbitrariness. In contrast, although
rules of evidence generally favor admissibility absent some
rule, statute or constitutional right barring admission, reliability is a central concern in the law of evidence.122
As a result, it has been state courts that have primarily, for
example, responded to accuracy concerns in criminal cases
raised by DNA exonerations and wrongful convictions, to adopt
119
Stein, supra note 14, at 66; see also id. at 124 (“The Court therefore avoids
telling state courts and legislators how to design and apply their evidence rules.
Yet for extreme deviations from its vision of due process, the Court retains a
residual power to interfere.”).
120
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
121
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 7–8 (2011); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 16 (2012); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel
and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1590
(2005); Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the
Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV.
133, 134, 147–72 (2008); Joseph D. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?,
72 MICH. L. REV., 717, 723 (1974); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 146 (2011); William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 818–19 (2006). For concerns cautioning against overreliance on accuracy concerns in criminal procedure, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The
Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law
and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 609–18, 621–23 (2005).
122
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402, 403 (providing that relevant evidence is admissible unless federal law provides otherwise but may be excluded if it presents a
danger of unfair prejudice); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Daubert Gatekeeping for
Eyewitness Identifications, 65 S.M.U. L. REV. 593, 601–16 (2012) (discussing
reliability in the context of eyewitness identifications).

R
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a range of accuracy related reforms to criminal procedure and
evidentiary rules.123 Perhaps that reflects the greater ability of
state courts to respond to evidentiary concerns and reliability
concerns, and the relatively restrained and procedural focus of
due process jurisprudence. Or it may simply reflect the changing approach of the Supreme Court towards procedural due
process rights, with a far greater emphasis (in criminal cases,
not civil cases) on costs of over-deterring officials, and an emphasis on admitting evidence, with a far greater reluctance
than during the Warren Court years to recognize new procedural or substantive due process rights that might bar admissibility of evidence in criminal cases.
II
HARMONIZING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EVIDENCE LAW
The choice between interpreting the constitution to exclude
otherwise admissible evidence or deferring to evidence law is
not as binary as the first Part has suggested. In key areas in
which the Supreme Court seemed to declare the constitution a
“trump” over evidence law, the Court later moderated (and
some feared eviscerated) the impact of its early rulings by engaging with evidence-law concerns, or engaging with limiting
principles drawn from constitutional sources. I will develop in
this Part how it may be preferable to harmonize constitutional
law and evidence law by relying on common principles, rather
than principles relevant in one area but irrelevant in the other.
Rather than viewing constitutional law as an occasional trump
over extreme unfairness in application of evidence law, constitutional law, I argue, is more often than appreciated, necessarily entwined with evidence law. Indeed, an understanding of
the relationship between constitutional law and evidence law
can help to better appreciate several difficult problem in constitutional theory, including the status of the exclusionary rule
and the Miranda warnings, and it can point the way to an
improved jurisprudence of constitutional evidence law, which
is the subject of Part III of this Article.
A. Tempering Constitutional Evidence Law
1. Exclusionary Rule Exceptionalism
The Supreme Court’s Mapp opinion appeared to announce
an expansive rule that: “[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same au123

For an overview, see GARRETT, supra note 121, at ch. 9.

R
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thority, inadmissible in a state court.”124 Such a strict constitutional rule, trumping the use of otherwise admissible
evidence, would not be maintained by the Supreme Court,
which has “long since rejected that approach.”125 In the decades since Mapp was decided, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule has a
“deterrence rationale.”126 The Court now highlights how while
the rule was intended to remedy and deter police misconduct,
that remedy is a “last resort.”127 Where the particular goal of
encouraging police to exercise a “greater degree of care” is not
met, then the rule should not apply, due to its “substantial
social costs.”128 The Court has emphasized, as noted, that
unlike the Fifth Amendment, “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands.”129 In U.S. v. Leon, for
example, the Supreme Court explained that whether “the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed” is “an issue separate” from whether the Fourth Amendment was violated (and
there the Court adopted an exception where police relied upon
a search warrant in “good faith”).130 A welter of exceptions to
the exclusionary rule have been recognized.
The method the Supreme Court adopted in these rulings
could be seen as a form of cost-benefit balancing, asking
whether the interest in deterrence outweighs the “substantial
social costs” of excluding evidence of guilt.131 What is particularly important for these purposes, however, is that this Fourth
Amendment balancing does not focus on the reliability of the
particular piece of evidence in question (which a court might
weight when deciding whether to admit a piece of evidence
124

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
126
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536–39 (1975).
127
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
128
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
129
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
130
Id. at 906–08. For a sampling of criticism and defenses of the decision, see
Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (arguing that Leon’s
result is correct but that the Court’s reasoning is wrong); Steven Duke, Making
Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1422–23 (1986) (arguing that Leon played a role in
“gutting the Fourth Amendment”); Wayne R. LaFave, “The Seductive Call of Expediency”: United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 895, 908 (1984) (arguing that Leon insulates decisions to issue warrants
from judicial review); Sean R. O’Brien, Note, United States v. Leon and the Freezing of the Fourth Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1993) (arguing that
Leon has not “choke[d] off the development of Fourth amendment law”).
131
Leon, 468 U.S. at 907–08.
125
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under a rule like Federal Rule of Evidence 403). Rather, the
balancing occurs at a more general and abstract level, focusing
on notions of fault and whether there is a need to deter police
who acted intentionally, or whether police (or other officers132)
instead “acted in objective good faith or their transgressions
have been minor.”133 Therefore, the Court has balanced the
right to privacy and the interest in deterring constitutional violations by officers as against the cost of excluding reliable evidence of guilt in criminal cases, resulting in the consequence
“that some guilty defendants may go free or received reduced
sentences.”134 Whether that balance is empirically informed is
another question; dissenting in Leon, Justice Brennan argued
that recent studies, including by the General Accounting Office
(GAO), “have demonstrated that federal and state prosecutors
very rarely drop cases because of potential search and seizure
problems”; the majority countered that “[n]o empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able
to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect.”135
Thus, the result is a set of exceptions that seek to accomplish a general evidentiary goal—admissibility of reliable evidence of guilt—but the exceptions themselves are motivated by
concepts of law enforcement effectiveness and fault, i.e., was
this “flagrant” misconduct, or would reasonable officers have
been on notice that their conduct clearly violated the Fourth
Amendment.136 The Court has created exceptions for evidentiary uses seen as less directly related to deterring police, such
as for impeachment uses of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.137 Since officers cannot be deterred
lacking notice that their conduct would violate the Fourth
Amendment, the Court has not extended the exclusionary rule
retroactively where new Fourth Amendment decisions are announced, or whether a criminal statute was later declared un132
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (holding that exclusion of
evidence based on the errors of court employees was not justified under Leon).
133
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.
134
Id. at 907.
135
Id. at 950 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 918 (quoting United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450 n.22 (1976)); see also Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should)
The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical
Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600 (1983) (suggesting that the relevant
“‘cost-benefit analysis’ [was arguably] worked out when the [F]ourth [A]mendment
was written”).
136
See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
137
See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975).
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constitutional.138 Good-faith exceptions have been recognized
for police negligence in securing a warrant and good faith reliance on a warrant139; most recently, in Herring v. United
States, the Supreme Court recognized a “good faith” exception
to the exclusionary rule where a bookkeeping error resulted in
the arrest warrant.140 Critics of these decisions have feared the
erosion if not the outright demise of the exclusionary rule.141
What is most important for these purposes, however, is
that the Supreme Court’s focus is not on just reconciling constitutional law with evidence law but with minimizing the impact of constitutional law on the otherwise-admissibility of this
evidence. The exclusionary rule case law is far from a model for
how to accommodate constitutional law to evidence law. The
stated goal is not to harmonize the underlying purposes of the
constitutional rule with that of any evidentiary rules. The goal
is to promote a different set of policy interests: the interests of
law enforcement. Thus, in Hudson v. Michigan, Justice Scalia
emphasized not just the “substantial social costs” of strictly
applying the rule but also matters totally outside of evidence
law, such as nonevidentiary deterrents now available, including the possibility of bringing a civil rights suit to deter police
misconduct.142
That said, there is some overlap with background principles in evidence law. The default position in codes of evidence,
such as the Federal Rules of Evidence, is that relevant evidence
will typically be admissible unless the U.S. Constitution or federal law or evidence-law sources state otherwise.143 Narrowly
interpreting rules of exclusion certainly is compatible with a
view that evidence law should typically permit admissibility of
138
See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) (admitting evidence
collected pursuant to a lawful search motivated by probable cause that suspected
had violated a statute held later to be unconstitutional); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (admitting evidence whose collection, although lawful at
the time it was obtained, would violate the Fourth Amendment under current
doctrine).
139
See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23 (admitting evidence collected in a search
pursuant to a warrant but found at trial to be unsupported by probable cause);
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978) (holding that a search is unlawful if conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained by knowingly or recklessly making false statements to a magistrate).
140
555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
141
See Jeffrey L. Fisher, Reclaiming Criminal Procedure, 38 GEO L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. xv (2009); Wayne R. LaFave, Recent Development: The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009).
142
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594–99 (2006).
143
See FED. R. EVID. 402.
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evidence that is reliable. On the latter point, however, only
occasionally in its Fourth Amendment cases has the Supreme
Court cited to concerns more directly grounded in the reliability of evidence. In United States v. White, for example, the
Court ruled that it was not error to admit audio evidence of
conversation with an informant, citing a reluctance to create
“constitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable,” contrasted with the
“unaided memory of a police agent.”144 Such rulings are not
the norm in the Fourth Amendment area. The Court has not
embraced evidence-law goals but has instead reduced the potential breadth of the exclusionary rule, and in doing so it
rejected “[r]esort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt.”145 The Court has sought to prevent exclusion of
evidence of guilt, regardless of its reliability.
2. Post-Crawford Embrace of Evidence Law
The Crawford revolution in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has also been tempered in its impact, but not with reference to purely “deterrence” or law enforcement-related
interests in admitting evidence of guilt. Rather, the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have engaged somewhat more
than in the Fourth Amendment context with institutional considerations that are also important to the structure of evidencelaw rules. The Crawford Court’s rejection of an evidence-lawaccommodating framework, citing to the history of the Sixth
Amendment’s protection, left a host of questions about how the
new concepts, most fundamentally whether a statement was
“testimonial,” would be defined and how they interacted with
existing evidence-law concepts.146 If a document contains a
statement that is “testimonial,” how does that relate to tradi-

144

401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599.
146
See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause,
92 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1893–1904 (2012) (suggesting that the Confrontation
Clause also limits the admission of nontestimonial hearsay); see also Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (finding that a victim’s statements identifying a defendant to a 911 operator not testimonial, but that those in the victim’s
affidavit to the police were). Regarding the immediate reaction to Crawford in
domestic violence cases, and how trial judges narrowly interpreted the decision,
see generally David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial
Bias in Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 995, 1000–08 (2005).
145
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tional business record exceptions to the hearsay rule?147 How
about the reports of expert witnesses?
Perhaps the Supreme Court could have adhered to a strict
view of Crawford, as Justice Antonin Scalia would prefer, regardless of the potential practical consequences. But merely
citing to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause and
common-law rules on out-of-court testimony has provided
scant guidance for how to resolve the myriad applications of
the rule in a modern setting, including the work of forensic
analysts in crime labs. As a result, the Justices have continued to grapple with the problem and hear new cases raising
different fact patterns concerning the question whether different types of excited utterances or expert evidence raise Confrontation Clause concerns under its new “testimonial”
evidence test.148
Dissenters in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts sought to
distinguish expert witnesses as different from other “ordinary”
types of witnesses and argued that Confrontation Clause doctrine should reflect the distinct treatment of expert witnesses in
evidence law.149 Indeed, having disclaimed a reliability-centered approach in Crawford, Justice Scalia writing in MelendezDiaz noted that cross-examination does have the secondary
benefit that it can serve reliability goals, and noted real flaws in
forensic testimony, stating: “Forensic evidence is not uniquely
immune from the risk of manipulation.”150 Justice Scalia added, “A forensic analyst responding to a request from a law
enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—
to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the
prosecution.”151
More recently, in Williams v. Illinois, the plurality opinion
relied on the fact that “settled evidence law” reflected in federal
and state evidence-law rules permitted the forensic expert to
opine on DNA testing conducted by an analyst from a different
crime lab, where not disclosed for the truth of that underlying
147
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (recognizing hearsay exception for records of
regularly conducted activity of a business).
148
See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation where a trial court allowed a lab analyst to testify that a DNA
profile generated by a forensic test performed by another analyst matched a
defendant’s DNA profile already on file with the police); Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (finding testimony by lab analyst who did not conduct
blood alcohol report to be adequate); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 311 (2009) (finding that formal forensic reports are testimonial).
149
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330–31 (Kennedy, J,, dissenting).
150
Id. at 318.
151
Id.
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information.152 No more than a plurality agreed to that evidence-law-based approach, however, and the Justices were
deeply split as to the rationale that explained the result in the
case. In Williams, Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, but
countered, “I do not think that rules of evidence should so
easily trump a defendant’s confrontations right.”153 In contrast, Justice Kagan dissented, calling the result “abdication to
state-law labels.”154 Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer joined
the opinion, creating a highly splintered result, in part relying
on reliability concerns more prominent in the pre-Crawford
cases.155 The Justices could not agree on any consistent status to be accorded to state rules of evidence, nor how “easily”
they should “trump” or what influence they should have on the
question whether the constitutional right should be interpreted
to avoid conflict or to simply supplant any inconsistent statelaw rules. The differences no doubt reflect differences in approaches towards constitutional interpretation generally and
not just differences in resolving the particular problem at hand.
Professors Jennifer Mnookin and David Kaye have carefully explored how it is particularly difficult to apply the Crawford rule in the area of scientific evidence, for which “courts
have long been willing, sometimes to the point of absurdity, to
say that information testifying experts detail to the jury in the
guise of describing the basis for their conclusions is not introduced for its truth,” but on the other hand, where science is
collective and experts must often rely on research and evidence
produced by others.156 Indeed, as they point out, there is a real
tension with rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which
permits experts to rely on otherwise admissible evidence such
as hearsay, and with the role of an expert to educate the jury
and offer analysis and conclusions not necessarily limited to
“truth.”157 The resulting opinions, with deep fractures
amongst the Justices, have not produced the clarity that the
Crawford Court desired, with Justices disagreeing about
152

132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2012) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2256 (Thomas, J., concurring).
154
Id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
155
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The central concern of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant.”
(citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990))).
156
Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and
the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 101 (2012); see also id. at 149
(“[I]t seems to us that the most important feature of science is that it is a collective,
rather than an individual enterprise.”).
157
Id. at 120, 139–40.
153
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whether the purposes of statements, such as expert affidavits,
count as “testimonial.”158
Whether a coherent body of law extending the Crawford
Confrontation Clause test to the area of expert evidence can
emerge very much remains to be seen.159 Perhaps the Court
should admit that its analysis is no longer, if it ever was, firmly
grounded in some kind of originalist interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, but now, as Professor Sklansky has explored, “fairness and accuracy matter, too,” and the Court
should admit that “present-day practicalities” matter as
well.160 For these purposes, I merely want to underscore that
declaring a clean break from evidence law was not nearly as
easy as it seemed in Crawford, at least for the group of Justices
concerned with the practical impact of the constitutional ruling
on the administration of criminal law and on litigation. Traditional evidentiary concerns, including reliability concerns, concerns of practicality and convenience, and the roles and nature
of distinct types of witnesses like expert witnesses, may all
continue to play a greater role as the Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence develops. I view that as a good thing, a type of
analysis that should be made explicit, and certainly preferable
to the type of weight placed balancing of highly generalized
interests in deterrence in the Fourth Amendment context.
More fine-grained balancing that focuses on the type of evidence, its reliability, and how it is produced, may produce far
better results.
3. Supplementing Evidence Law
In the area of eyewitness identification evidence, discussed
briefly in the last Part in reference to the Perry decision, the
Supreme Court amalgamated constitutional law with evidence
158
For scholarly criticisms, see, e.g., Deborah Ahrens & John Mitchell, Don’t
Blame Crawford or Bryant, The Mess is all Davis’s Fault, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 104,
105 (2012) (characterizing “Confrontation Clause jurisprudence” as “a mess”);
Dylan O. Keenan, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the Lower Courts, 122
YALE L.J. 782, 785 (2012) (noting that “scholars generally agree that Crawford’s
stated doctrine is vague and that lower courts have struggled to apply it”);
Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and “Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147,
148 (2006) (“Crawford v. Washington created a wave of uncertainty regarding the
significance of the newly defined Confrontation Clause.”).
159
Professors Mnookin and Kaye suggest compromises that fulfill Confrontation Clause values while taking into account that “science is a collective phenomenon,” including by permitting surrogate expert witnesses in narrow
circumstances and relying on adequate documentation. Mnookin & Kaye, supra
note 156, at 155.
160
Sklansky, supra note 49, at 515–16.
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law in a quite unique and surprising way. In its earliest 1960s
decisions, the Court had ruled that the Due Process Clause
forbade the introduction of unnecessarily suggestive identification techniques.161 Then, dissatisfied with the rigidity of that
“per se” approach, the Court in Manson v. Brathwaite in 1977
altered the framework by adopting a “reliability” test, designed
to excuse improper police conduct that violated the constitution by offering trial judges a series of factors to apply when
deciding whether to exclude the evidence at trial.162 The factors examine the following: (1) the eyewitness’s opportunity to
view the culprit at the time of the crime; (2) the eyewitness’s
degree of attention when viewing the culprit; (3) the accuracy of
the description the eyewitness provides to the police of the
culprit; (4) the eyewitness’s level of certainty at the time of the
identification procedure; and (5) the length of time that had
elapsed between the crime and the identification procedure in
question.163
Those so-called “reliability” factors were not drawn from
scientific research but rather were distilled from prior judicial
rulings.164 The factors are highly problematic, and as a 2014
report by the National Research Council of the National Academies of Science describes in some detail, subsequent decades
of fairly intensive scientific and social science research has
shown these factors do not correspond to the reliability of an
eyewitness identification.165 Similar rules have also been
adopted in the Sixth Amendment context, limiting the right
under United States v. Wade to have counsel present at a postindictment live lineup, should there be “independent” evidence
of reliability of the identification.166
The Supreme Court’s attempt, whether justified or not (and
I have criticized the ruling as poorly conceived and in need of
161

See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295–96 (1967).
432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 31 (2014) (I note that I served on the committee that
produced that report); Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 451, 453 (2012); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified
the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing
Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998); Gary L. Wells & Deah S.
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme
Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 9–14 (2009).
166
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
162
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an overhaul in light of subsequent scientific research),167 did
constitute a judicial effort to blunt the impact of a due process
rule permitting the exclusion of eyewitness evidence, by adding
an overlay permitting the consideration of a range of traditional
evidentiary factors that might otherwise be considered by balancing prejudice and probative impact of evidence under rules
like Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Constitutional law was supplemented with a rule reflecting a traditional rule of evidence.
Moreover, this is an area in which the Due Process Clause
shared an underlying concern with the reliability of evidence
along with rules like Rule 403. The result may have been
poorly constructed, and the rule, in my view, should be almost
entirely scrapped. Indeed, explicit reliance on Rule 403 rather
than a court-made set of factors might have left trial judges
more room to update the analysis as scientific research on
eyewitness memory progressed. However, the Manson v.
Brathwaite test was a notable effort in one respect: evidentiary
concerns were themselves incorporated into a constitutional
test. The unfortunate result provides a cautionary tale as to
the dangers of engaging in such constitutional interpretation
and then failing to revisit the results as evidence law changes
or as scientific research advances.
B. Ambiguous Evidence Law
In some areas, traditional evidence rules may themselves
have been highly uncertain or confused, making it unclear
whether a constitutional right would have any problematic impact on evidence outcomes, and making any concern with a
conflict far less great. On the admissibility of prior convictions,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the common law was “far
more ambivalent” than often supposed and that “the common
law developed broad, vaguely defined exceptions—such as
proof of intent, identity, malice, motive, and plan—whose application is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge.”168 As
a result, the Court approved a federal due process rule that
“where a defendant’s prior conviction is unconstitutional or
unreliable, it may not be introduced in evidence against that
defendant for any purpose.”169 Evidence law was not rejected
nor incorporated; it was itself sufficiently unclear that the constitutional rule was compatible with the state of evidence law.
167
168
169

See Garrett, supra note 165, at 453.
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983).
Id.

R
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1. Voluntariness of Confessions
The law of confessions is another area in which the
Supreme Court has assumed that prejudice will generally be so
powerful that evidence rules short of excluding confession evidence entirely will not suffice to protect against the dangers
that the constitutional rights seek to protect. Yet, contradictorily, it is also an area in which the Court has disavowed any
rule to ensure reliability of evidence, leaving that task to state
evidence law. The Court’s earlier decisions regulating confessions, such as Jackson v. Denno, strongly emphasized longstanding concern with the unreliability of coerced confession
evidence, noting that the Fifth Amendment was concerned with
both “the probable unreliability of confessions” but also the
“complex of values” served by insisting that the government not
“wring[ ] a confession out of an accused against his will.”170 In
Jackson v. Denno, the Court additionally ruled that involuntary
confessions cannot be admitted at trial.171 In Bruton v. United
States, the Court found it impermissible to allow the incriminating statements of a codefendant to be admitted in a joint
trial due to the potential for prejudice.172 However, in the decades since, the Court has disclaimed constitutional regulation
of reliability of confessions. In Colorado v. Connelley, for example, a schizophrenic defendant thought he was hearing the
“voice of God” during his interrogation, but the Court found no
“essential link” between coercion by the State and the confession that resulted.173 Any review of this highly problematic
confession, which “might be proved to be quite unreliable,” the
Court admitted, would be “a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum . . . not by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”174
Yet one explanation for this result is that traditional evidence-law rules required very little by way of corroboration of
170
378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,
206–07 (1960)); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 282 (1936) (describing for example, how two defendants “confessed in every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the crime,
and as the whippings progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted
their confession in all particulars of detail so as to conform to the demands of their
torturers”). For a detailed discussion of those earlier rulings, see Richard A. Leo et
al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the
Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 492–99 (2006).
171
378 U.S. 368, 388–91 (1964).
172
391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
173
479 U.S. 157, 161, 165 (1986).
174
Id. at 167.
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confession evidence.175 The Supreme Court was not avoiding
interference with evidence law that had much of an established
practice of careful reliability review of confession evidence, but
rather the Court was operating on a fairly clean slate. The
suggestion that state evidentiary rules would operate to exclude even a potentially false confession rang quite false. If
anything, it was the Court’s own turn towards reliability as
relevant to the question of voluntariness that was then neglected in later rulings interpreting the voluntariness test as
primarily if not exclusively focusing on official coercion and not
reliability.176
2. Miranda Exceptionalism
The Miranda rule, unlike the voluntariness test for examining whether a confession statement can be admitted, requires
that warnings be provided to inform a suspect of their privilege
and rights prior to a custodial interrogation.177 That rule has
been much limited by a series of rulings over the four decades
since, so much so that commentators view the rule as all but
overruled.178 As the Supreme Court has put it, these rulings
have “reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming [Miranda]’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.”179 The exceptions that the Supreme
Court has recognized to the Miranda rule create what amounts
to a detailed evidence code. They now include: a public safety
exception,180 an exception for questioning by covert or undercover officers,181 and an exception for questioning during rou175
See Brandon L. Garrett, Confession Contamination Revisited, 101 VA. L.
REV. 395, 410 (2015); Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1110–12 (2010); Richard A. Leo et al., supra note 170, at 486;
Richard A. Leo, Peter J. Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting
Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability
Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 778–79
(2013).
176
See Leo et al., supra note 170, at 486. Some lower courts, however, have
interpreted the voluntariness framework as accommodating certain reliability
concerns. See supra Part III.
177
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
178
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2010) (“Miranda has effectively been overruled.”); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda,
87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 984 (2012) (noting the “piece-by-piece ‘overruling’ of Miranda”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1521
(2008) (“Miranda is largely dead.”).
179
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004).
180
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984).
181
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990).
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tine booking;182 permitting police to renew questioning if a
suspect initiates additional conversation, or after sufficient
passage of time;183 requiring that a suspect use precise language to invoke the right;184 permitting police to use “fruits” of
non-Mirandized statements;185 permitting impeachment use of
non-Mirandized statements,186 holding prolonged silence following Miranda warnings insufficient to invoke its protection,187 and that silence during noncustodial questioning may
be used as impeachment.188
This welter of Supreme Court rulings takes the form of a
detailed code, and it includes institutional analysis of the circumstances with which waivers will be inferred, whether police
noncompliance should result in exclusion, and the incentives
and needs of police during investigations. This is not constitutional common law but rather a constitutional evidence law
developed in a common-law fashion, as part of a concerted set
of moves to blunt the practical evidentiary impact of the Miranda rule outside the core Fifth Amendment concern with
admission of “unwarned,” self-incriminating statements at
trial.189 The result is not deference to evidence law but rather
the creation of a constitutional evidence code, accompanied by
rules of pretrial and trial practice regarding the preservation
and waiver of rights concerning such evidence, and the remedies for violation of the evidentiary right. As such, however, I
have argued here that neither the rule announced in Miranda,
nor the body of case law interpreting its scope that followed, is
exceptional.
Is Miranda really so exceptional? It appears unusual when
viewed alongside other constitutional rights that regulate executive action, or the content of legislation, or procedural rights
that arise for the first time at a criminal trial. It appears far less
unusual in the context of other Fifth Amendment rulings, since
the Fifth Amendment privilege has itself been much elaborated
as to its application in a range of contexts, from civil, criminal,
182

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990).
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611–12 (2004) (plurality opinion); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,
1043–44 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1975).
184
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 527–30 (1987).
185
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004).
186
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1975); Harris v. United States,
401 U.S. 222, 226 (1970).
187
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 380–82 (2010).
188
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179–80 (2013).
189
Patane, 542 U.S. at 633–34.
183
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to administration cases and during post-conviction review, together with rules for its waiver.190 As noted, however, constitutional scholars have long puzzled over what status to accord
Miranda. Scholars have made efforts to categorize Miranda using the language of constitutional common law,191 or subconstitutional safeguard,192 or decision rules versus remedies.193
The focus of the doctrine is admissibility in court of out-ofcourt statements, and yet the rule provides a set of warnings to
be given by police in an interrogation room.
Those scholarly efforts can be simplified: Miranda is constitutional evidence law. If seen as evidence law in the narrow
sense of establishing a condition for the admissibility of an
interrogation statement, it seems like a narrow type of evidentiary rule. But seen as a part and parcel of a broader regulation
of the conditions for waiver of Fifth Amendment rights and the
protection of the privilege in and out of court, Miranda fits in
well with the larger body of constitutional doctrine. I have developed in Parts I and II of this Article how in a host of areas,
constitutional law and evidence law inform each other and are
developed in a mutual way. Miranda does not look like a
merely “prophylactic” right from an evidence-law perspective,
since evidentiary rights commonly operate in just that fashion,
accompanied by rules surrounding pretrial waiver and trial
practice-related rules and remedies for any violation. As described in Part I, there is nothing unusual in evidence law
about the concept that out-of-court conduct, and even warnings providing notice that an evidentiary right may be waived if
not asserted, must be given to a person in order to properly
preserve evidence for use in court. Evidentiary privileges may
be waived if they are not asserted in a timely manner at the
appropriate phase of litigation or an investigation. Failure to
provide warnings that waiver might result, however, may sometimes bar the subsequent use of the evidence, but still additional rules may develop the scope of such trial remedies,
which may include jury instructions given as an alternative to
exclusion of the evidence.

190
See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 311–12 (1991) (holding that
Fifth Amendment violations may be found to be harmless errors); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (holding that the privilege “can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory
or adjudicatory”).
191
See Merrill, supra note 16.
192
See Abramowicz, supra note 17.
193
See Berman, supra note 1, at 127.
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And nor is it surprising that evidentiary rules for the
proper litigation of constitutional rights would have to be elaborated in the Fifth Amendment setting, in which the constitutional right is intimately concerned with evidence admitted in
court. Thus, I argue that Miranda is no outlier and not an
example of exceptional treatment by the Supreme Court. It
mirrors the approaches taken by the Court in due process rulings, Confrontation Clause rulings, exclusionary rule cases,
and the other areas examined in this Article. A mixture of
constitutional values and evidence-law approaches animates
the doctrinal result of the collision of the two. What is unsatisfying is something different: the lack of clarity concerning why
different outcomes can result in different constitutional and
evidence-law contexts. That is the problem to which I turn in
Part III.
III
DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
EVIDENCE LAW
Judges and scholars have struggled over questions
whether constitutional rules such as the exclusionary rule are
substantive or remedial,194 whether Miranda is truly constitutional or a prophylactic, or whether punitive damages rulings
represent substantive or procedural due process. These constitutional debates cannot be avoided in many contested areas,
given the difficulties of untangling substance from procedure.
However, in the areas discussed, I have offered a solution to the
category problem, at least. Such questions can be more comfortably seen as lying at the intersection of constitutional law
and evidence law, in which the right and the remedy both relate
to questions of what evidence may be admissible at a trial and
how it should be presented at trial. There is not the same
distinction between substance and procedure or right and remedy, where the questions are procedural in a sense but also
linked to the nature and substance of the evidence and the
values underlying its collection, introduction, and weight.
Nor can constitutional rights be always understood as separate from their application in the courtroom, regarding what
evidence may or may not be presented, both when constitutional rights are “specific” and directly regulate evidentiary
matters, and when constitutional rights more generally seek to
prevent unfair outcomes at trial. A richer understanding of not
194

Id. at 8 n.27.
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only constitutional considerations underlying courts’ reluctance or desire to supplement evidence law but also of the
values underlying evidence rules, is warranted to better inform
this entire area. This Part turns from the definition of the
problem as one of the intersection and potential conflict of
constitutional rights and evidence law to potential solutions.
This Part aims to develop connections between those values,
summarizing certain work by evidence scholars and then setting out a framework for identifying and then adjudicating conflicts between constitutional law and evidence law.
A. Evidence Law Principles and Values
The preceding parts describe some situations in which
constitutional rulings take cognizance of evidence law and
some in which they do not. Conversely, evidence codes are
often written without any recognition that constitutional rights
apply. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence simply note
that relevant evidence will typically be admissible, unless the
U.S. Constitution or federal law or evidence-law sources state
otherwise.195 The commentary to Federal Rule of Evidence
Rule 402 highlights how “[t]he rule recognizes but makes no
attempt to spell out the constitutional considerations which
impose basic limitations upon the admissibility of relevant evidence.”196 Any constitutional rights operate separate and
apart from the rules of evidence.
Although state and federal rules of evidence generally favor
admissibility, as noted, absent some rule, statute or constitutional right barring admission, reliability is a central concern in
the law of evidence.197 Reliability is not often embraced in
constitutional rulings, however, even when the term “reliability” is deployed. In the exclusionary rule context, “reliability”
refers to nonexclusion of evidence, and not whether the particular evidence is actually reliable in a given case. The nonexclusion concern is valid, but “reliability” is a misleading term to
use. In a few areas, such as in the eyewitness-misidentification
area, reliability is used correctly, but reliability concerns are
not adequately reflected in the doctrine. And to be sure, most
evidence codes do not contain detailed rules designed to ensure
reliability through empirically validated provisions. Crawford
may have displaced hearsay rules that reflected reliability concerns, but traditional hearsay doctrine, with its complexities
195
196
197

See FED. R. EVID. 402.
FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note.
See id.
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and many exceptions, is an extremely rough guide to reliability
and has been much criticized in its particulars and its implementation by generations of scholars and judges.198 Where
evidence law cannot easily get reliability right and tends, when
in doubt, to prefer admissibility of the evidence, perhaps it is no
surprise that constitutional law most often does the same.
As evidence law changes, however, the approach towards
reliability may shift. More state courts are now turning to their
own law of evidence as a source for developing more detailed
rules concerning reliability of eyewitness identification evidence; some of these experiments may prove successful, while
others may not.199 State courts can and should rely on evidence law to supplement a constitutional test since, after all,
most constitutional rules are designed only to address extreme
unfairness or particular procedural guarantees. Perhaps
states would do so more often if it was clearer that a constitutional right serves a more narrow purpose. The Supreme
Court’s so-called “reliability” test for eyewitness identifications
may give the impression that it is a test well designed to assess
reliability, which it is not, despite the repetition of the word
“reliability” in the Court’s Manson v. Brathwaite opinion. Now
that more research has shown just how outdated the test is,
more state courts have supplemented that test with their own
rules, as they have already done by opening the doors towards
admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness evidence.200
Perhaps over time, these developments in the states will influence the constitutional standard.
Reliability is far from the only important value served by
evidence rules, of course. As the commentary to Federal Rule
of Evidence Rule 403 explains, “[e]xclusion for risk of unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or waste of
time, all find ample support in the authorities.”201 Even reliable evidence may be too prejudicial in its impact.
198
See, e.g., Rupert Cross, What Should Be Done About the Rule Against
Hearsay?, 1965 CRIM. L. REV. 68, 80–84 (likewise arguing for the reform of British
hearsay doctrine); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 218 (1948) (arguing for reform of
hearsay doctrine: “[S]hould we not recognize that the rational basis for the hearsay classification is not the formula, ‘assertions offered for the truth of the matter
asserted,’ but rather the presence of substantial risks of insincerity and faulty
narration, memory, and perception?”).
199
For a prominent example of a state court using scientific research to inform
the interpretation of state reliability rules in the area of eyewitness-identification
evidence, see State v. Lawson, 244 P.3d 860, 872–873 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
200
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 165, at 34–37.
201
FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes.

R
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The concern with confusion to the jury, in an area that
risks constitutional violations, was present in some of the
Supreme Court rulings discussed, for example, in punitive
damages rulings, as well as rulings highlighting the unique
prejudicial impact of a statement of confession by a criminal
defendant. In the area of expert testimony, many courts use a
test asking whether the expert’s testimony “assists the fact
finder” or is beyond common knowledge.202 Many of those assumptions were based on rules of thumb, or views of the traditional functions of the jury, such as that credibility is seen as
the province of the jury, and scholars have criticized the case
law for years.203 Trial court rulings on what does or does not
confuse jurors themselves could also be better informed by
research; perhaps if it was, constitutional rulings would be
better able to engage with important questions relating to what
assists the jury.
Evidence rules may also serve procedural values. Evidence
rules that err on the side of admissibility can serve to permit
the parties to have a full and fair day in court; the Confrontation Clause serves such goals, as do a range of due process
rules.204 As a result, due process and fair trial constitutional
rights may serve similar goals as evidence rules designed to
permit both sides to have a full hearing; perhaps that explains
why often such rights are seen as compatible with evidence
rules. Then again, there may be debate over which values evidence rules or constitutional rules in fact serve. Confrontation
Clause rulings for some time emphasized reliability as a central
value served by confronting witnesses, while in Crawford the
Court rejected reliance on “amorphous notions of ‘reliabil202
Michael Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory,
1 PSCHYOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909, 923 (1995).
203
See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2.1.3 (2014) (describing how “courts continue to exclude expert testimony
because it is either not necessary, not ‘beyond the ken of the jury,’ or not ‘beyond
the common knowledge’ of the average layperson. These courts incorrectly believe
that the ‘assist the trier of fact’ requirement of Rule 702 and state equivalents
restate the common law.” (citations omitted)); Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer
and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. REV. 53, 64 (1991)
(criticizing the common law of evidence for not taking into account scientific
evidence regarding the reliability of eyewitnesses).
204
See Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 626 (1992);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Catharsis, the Confrontation Clause, and Expert Testimony, 22
CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 130 (1993) (“The right to confront witnesses is directly related
to these notions of perceived procedural justice.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself
Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L.
REV. 1, 59–63, 89–90, 92, 115–19 (1993).
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ity.’”205 The Court then explained: “the Clause’s ultimate goal
is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee.”206 The “crucible of cross-examination” promotes reliability in the Court’s view, but the constitutional test does not itself involve a form of reliability
review.207 Thus, the Court, even when rejecting a test that
conformed to common-law hearsay rules, nonetheless made
efforts to explain why the constitutional test was compatible
with evidence-law values. The reasoning in Crawford shows
how, depending on the level of generality, inconsistent rules
can be found to serve broadly compatible goals. A full airing of
the potential conflict, however, can at least serve to more
clearly explain why a procedural constitutional rule was selected over an evidence-law-based rule.
Evidentiary privileges may also serve more complex professional and institutional values. Privileges may serve an “instrumental rationale” to promote communication with
professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, and between spouses,
that evidence law has long recognized as socially valuable.208
Regarding the attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court has
explained, “[t]he purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients
to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”209 Evidentiary privileges also serve more “humanistic” privacy and autonomy interests in the ability to make choices in consultation with
professionals.210 And limitations and exceptions to such privilege rules may address a range of values, including litigationfairness concerns, litigation-cost concerns, detection of crimes,
and the interests of enforcement agencies, among other policy
considerations.211 Sixth Amendment right to counsel protections relate to and, in some settings, overlap with concerns
reflected in attorney-client and work-product privilege law.212
205

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
Id.
207
Id.
208
Imwinkelreid, supra note 203, at § 5.2.
209
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1996) (discussing “public goals” supporting recognition
of psychotherapist-patient privilege).
210
Imwinkelried, supra note 203, at § 5.2.3.
211
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (extending protection to inadvertent disclosures during federal proceedings or enforcement investigations). Regarding the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2), (3).
212
Regarding privacy of attorney-client communication and Sixth Amendment
rights, see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.8(b) (4th ed. 2004).
206

R

R
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The focus of the Court on the “deterrence rationale” related
to constitutional violations is not unrelated to concerns reflected in some evidentiary doctrines on deterring different
types of socially harmful behavior. Such intersections, where
constitutional values may reinforce evidentiary values, might
profitably be developed both in scholarship and in caselaw.
B. The Compulsory Process Clause
One area in which the lower courts have been tasked with
explicit balancing of constitutional and evidence-law values is
in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
The area offers positive lessons, in that the tension between
constitutional rights and evidence-law interests is often clear,
made clear by the relevant case law, and there is a large body of
lower-court law applying it. As in other areas discussed in Part
I, under the Compulsory Process Clause there has been a parallel turn in the law from evidence-law sources to a separate
and (sometimes) superseding constitutional test. There is no
constitutional provision recognizing a general right to present
evidence in criminal cases. However, the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process Clause recognize rights to confront and obtain witnesses in the favor of the
accused.213 As discussed above, procedural justice values are
served by preserving the ability to present evidence, and to
some extent, evidence law reflects such values. However, over
time, the common-law rules of evidence developed to impose
real barriers in presenting evidence.214 Most notably, the common law largely disqualified potentially interested witnesses,
making it difficult for parties in civil cases to testify at all (since
they might be biased or have incentives to lie) and making it
difficult for criminal defendants to call witnesses (including
themselves).215
For over a century, federal courts simply followed the
common-law approach. For example, in United States v. Reid,
two defendants jointly charged with murder on the high seas
sought to call each other as witnesses; while noting that the
Sixth Amendment was designed to prevent common-law rules
from limiting witness testimony, including in serious criminal
213

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499,
500 (1999).
215
For example, in felony and treason cases, common law did not permit the
defense to call witnesses at trial at all. See 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1786 (1st ed. 1833).
214
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cases, the Court explicitly held that the rules of evidence in
federal courts were those adopted by the states when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted, and those rules in effect
trumped any Sixth Amendment concerns.216 In 1918 the
Court overruled Reid, relying on statutory changes to the federal criminal code, but also stating that it would not be bound
by “the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789,” and stating “the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be
arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent
understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts
involved in a case.”217 Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment’s
Compulsory Process Clause was still seen as accommodating
in some respects the “dead hand” of common-law or state law
privileges.
Beginning in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court changed
course, incorporating the right as against the states, and finding that the Clause, largely due to related Due Process Clause
concerns, sometimes permits a defendant the right to introduce evidence even in contravention of such evidentiary privileges.218 In the case of Washington v. Texas, the Court
incorporated the Compulsory Process Clause as fundamental
under the Due Process Clause and explained that this constitutional concern applied to categorical evidence-law rules excluding certain types of witness testimony: “It is difficult to see
how the Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that
prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying
on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy
of belief.”219 For example, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court
concluded that despite a state rule that would have protected
certain victim statements made to a child victim’s service
agency as privileged, those materials must be turned over to
the judge, examined in camera, and information potentially

216

53 U.S. 361, 363 (1851).
Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
218
See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (describing how at the time, the right to compulsory process did “not override and abolish such exemptions and privileges as may be otherwise recognized
by common law or statute”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967);
Welsh S. White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant’s Constitutional Right to
Introduce Evidence, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1989) (“Since 1967, Supreme Court decisions based on the compulsory process clause, the confrontation
clause, and the due process clause have held that in some situations the defendant’s right to present relevant evidence in her defense must override evidentiary
rules to the contrary.”).
219
388 U.S. at 22.
217
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useful to the defense disclosed.220 In a different context, implicating the Due Process Clause but also the Compulsory Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court held
in Rock v. Arkansas that the right to testify on one’s own behalf
was so important that it overcame serious reliability objections
in state court due to the fact that the defendant’s testimony
was “hypnotically refreshed.”221 The constitutional right and
its procedural justice values trumped potentially quite serious
reliability concerns.
That said, these cases emphasize that while categorical or
per se state hearsay rules may be unconstitutional as applied,
the right to present evidence may or may not be violated depending on the facts and circumstances.222 Most defense attacks on application of evidentiary privileges, ranging from
attorney-client privilege, to physician-patient privilege, to
spousal privilege, to psychotherapist-patient privilege, to marriage counsel-client privilege, have failed.223
Since the constitutional test permits balancing depending
on the “circumstances,” courts may highlight the important
policies and privacy interests protected by the particular type
of privilege, including “tension” between the constitutional
rights of a criminal defendant and the rights of an alleged crime
victim.224 As a result, the constitutional test can flexibly accommodate evidence-law values in a way that can prevent extreme denial of a defense and bars imposing absolute or per se
rules; instead lower courts (and perhaps the evidence rules
themselves) must articulate the specific purposes of accommodating the privilege in a particular case. The result may generate more informed evidence law and constitutional law. The
result is not, however, a model of clarity. While I describe in
the sections that follow a marching order of steps that courts
might follow to break down whether there is a conflict and what
analysis might resolve it, any intersection between complex
evidence-law rules and constitutional rights is bound to pro220

480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987).
483 U.S. 44, 58–61 (1987).
222
Id. at 62 (criticizing a state’s “per se rule” against post-hypnosis testimony
based on “circumstances” present in the case); see also Imwinkelried, supra note
203, at § 11.3.2 (2014) (“[T]he precedents bear out the conclusion that the courts
ought to utilize as-applied balancing analysis in adjudicating the constitutionality
of evidentiary rules attacked under the accused’s constitutional right to present a
defense.”).
223
Imwinkelried, supra note 203, at § 11.4.2.
224
See id. (citing United States v. Friedman, 636 F. Supp. 462, 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993); State v. Roper,
836 P.2d 445 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)).
221

R
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duce complex results. This makes it all the more important
that the analysis be transparent.
C. Influence of Constitutional Rulings on Evidence
A general reluctance to interfere with evidence law no
longer exists, if it ever did exist apart from its invocation in
particular settings for particular reasons. Justice Jackson’s
famous passage in Michelson reflects a real reluctance to interfere with evidence law for specific reasons having to do with the
doctrine in question, and in a range of areas, the Supreme
Court has tried mightily to accommodate constitutional rights
to the traditional evidence-law rules. The due process revolution similarly reflects an inevitable tension, reflecting a highly
selective distaste for regulating the reliability of evidence in
criminal trials, a more conflicted approach towards damages in
civil trials, and a desire to leave such matters to state evidentiary rules, while the Court has nevertheless taken on in its
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence ambitious efforts to supplant traditional evidence-law rules. Conflict between constitutional interpretation and evidence law is here to stay. I
suggest that clarifying if not resolving those conflicts may require greater attention to evidentiary concerns.
The Supreme Court is understandably primarily focused
on developing a constitutional right, and not on the trial procedure or evidence rules that will be affected when the rubber
meets the road and the constitutional right is litigated in lower
courts. Perhaps given more time, if the Court revisits the issue,
if an egregious misuse of a constitutional ruling catches the
Court’s attention, as in Crane v. Kentucky, conflicts in the
lower courts can be resolved.225 However, evidentiary questions may not easily be preserved, and the Court takes so few
cases each year. Then again, that has not stopped the Court
from hearing quite a few Crawford-related cases. Perhaps the
Court’s attention to the potential evidentiary implications of its
ruling simply depends on whether the current set of Justices’
interests are sufficiently aroused, as with any type of constitutional question, given the Court’s discretionary docket. If a
group of Justices loses the appetite to engage with a problem,
like eyewitness memory or the review of state punitive damages
verdicts, then the constitutional standard may remain unaltered, and evidentiary issues will remain unresolved. Selective
attention is inevitable in an era of shrinking Supreme Court
225

476 U.S. 683, 690–91 (1986).
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dockets.226 In my view, more attention should be directed towards areas in which evidentiary uses outright conflict with the
underlying purposes of the constitutional right. Lower courts
can play a more prominent role when that does occur, but the
Court has not specified the details of the various evidentiary
uses.
The areas in which state and lower courts have instead
arguably misused language from constitutional rulings share a
common theme: that having defined the constitutional right,
the Supreme Court had not offered clear rules on how to appropriately evaluate evidence affected by a constitutional violation.
For example, where the Court had not adequately described
what makes for reliable eyewitness-identification evidence,
lower courts may have adopted language from an authoritative
source—the Supreme Court—without any better options and
with the view that quoting the Court was unlikely to result in
an appellate reversal.227
Confining the analysis to the areas in which a constitutional right is implicated, I suggest that commenting on the
quality of evidence may actually be an important role for appellate and post-conviction courts, even if constitutional rights
only permit a remedy in cases of egregious evidentiary rulings.
Recent opinions denying relief nevertheless can send signals to
lower courts, even if the procedural posture of the cases did not
permit sufficient direct engagement with the evidence. For example, in McDaniel v. Brown, the Justices commented on “the
prosecutor’s fallacy,” and other errors and “faulty assumptions,” in the presentation of statistics regarding a DNA test,
and ultimately denied relief because of the high standard to
prevail on a Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency of the evidence
claim.228 The Court’s strong language concerning the nature of
those errors in the presentation of the DNA evidence, however,

226
See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1252 (2012); Kenneth W. Starr,
The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2006).
227
For an essay that builds on the analysis in this Article and explores these
lower-court rulings in some detail, see Brandon L. Garrett, Mis-constitutionalized
Evidence Law (Feb. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
228
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128, 132 (2010). In addition, the Court
denied relief on a “newly minted” due process claim not presented below that the
DNA testimony was an “unreliable” form of identification testimony, analogous to
a suggestive eyewitness identification. Id. at 135–36.
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may powerfully influence lower courts, as scholars have
suggested.229
In Cavazos v. Smith, the Supreme Court denied relief on
another Jackson v. Virginia claim in a case involving shaken
baby syndrome (SBS) evidence, emphasizing both statutory
rules requiring deference in federal habeas corpus, and that “it
is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what
conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at
trial.”230 However, the Court noted disputes regarding the
medical evidence concerning cause of death at trial, and based
on new medical evidence and advances in the research, the
Court stated: “Doubts about whether Smith is in fact guilty are
understandable.”231 Indeed, the Court noted that clemency
might be appropriate, and the Governor subsequently did grant
clemency in the case.232 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued,
“What is now known about shaken baby syndrome (SBS) casts
grave doubt on the charge leveled.”233 A discussion of that type
about the state of the research and the reliability of the medical
testimony in question may have a real impact on presentation
of SBS testimony in lower courts, even if given the procedural
posture of the case, no relief was granted. When lower federal
courts and state courts do the same, they can similarly impact
the quality of evidence development, even when denying relief
on a constitutional claim.
Whether the Supreme Court in particular is well equipped,
in contrast to lower state and federal courts, or legislatures or
rules committees, to examine specialized evidentiary questions
or conduct independent research is a troubling question (as is
the question whether more attention should be paid to use of
extra-record or legislative facts in constitutional interpretation
more generally).234 Given the limited number of cases that the
229
James S. Liebman, Shawn Blackburn, David Mattern & Jonathan Waisnor, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98
IOWA L. REV. 577, 615 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s recent recognition that allowing jurors presented with DNA to operate under the prosecutor’s fallacy when
evidence may be ‘fundamentally unfair’ will no doubt accelerate the search for
solutions, including potentially the routine use of Bayes’ Theorem to highlight the
role of prior odds.”).
230
132 S. Ct. 2, 3–4 (2011).
231
Id. at 7.
232
Id.; see also Michael Robinson Chavez, Jerry Brown Commutes Grandmother’s Murder Sentence, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/04/shaken-baby-clemency.html (stating
governor had “significant doubts” about guilt).
233
132 S. Ct. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234
See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age,
56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1263 (2007) (“[J]udges facing unfamiliar and complex scien-
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Court hears, the state of the factual record when cases do
appear before the Court, and the Court’s limited ability to develop facts much less assess how well they are developed at
trials, the Court may be right to sometimes tread cautiously.
However, one theme of this Article is that the Court’s sometimes stated deference to evidence law is highly selectively invoked and may not be a compelling excuse for failing to address
the substance of the claims raised.
The Supreme Court’s role in policing the application of
constitutional rules in trial litigation is even more complex
when it is interpreting general constitutional rules that will
apply across different jurisdictions with some variation in evidentiary practices. Perhaps when the rules are uniform, the
Court has a clearer role to play. It is a separate topic how the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those rules, impacts other courts. For example, Daubert
has been adopted as codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and by most states, either formally or informally. It is not clear
how well such decisions speak to those that generate evidence
in the first instance. For example, we do not know whether the
Court’s Confrontation Clause decisions have actually improved
the quality of forensics work in laboratories, and there is every
reason to think that they have not. It is possible that Daubert
and its progeny have encouraged litigants (or even researchers)
to generate more accurate scientific evidence for use in the
courtroom, but there is every reason to think that any effects
are small.235
D. Identifying Conflicting Constitutional and Evidence
Rules
As I have described, the problem of reconciling constitutional rights to evidence-law rules extends to still additional
areas, including a range of areas important in criminal trials,
and from U.S. Supreme Court rulings into state court pattern
instructions. Language from constitutional rulings must be
tific admissibility decisions can and should engage in independent library research to better educate themselves about the underlying principles and
methods.”); Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1255, 1305–11 (2012) (comparing “minimalist” and “maximalist” approaches
to “in-house fact finding”).
235
For skeptical accounts, see David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial
Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 28–29 (2013);
Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65, 70–74, 82–83 (2006);
Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism
of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 273 (2006).
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applied in civil and criminal litigation, and the ways that constitutional rulings influence broader areas of practice is a
larger and unwieldy subject. This is a problem shared by the
Supreme Court and by lower courts. And yet there are no
ground rules for how to resolve conflicts between constitutional
rights and evidentiary rules. In some contexts, the Court
claims to rely on text and the specificity of the constitutional
right, but a range of additional considerations seem to
predominate as a descriptive matter, including concerns of reliability, deterrence, federalism, finality, seriousness of the violation, underlying evidence-law clarity, and underlying evidencelaw values.
As a preliminary matter, I believe that courts, having observed the potential for a conflict, should provide guidance on
evidentiary implications of constitutional rulings. The Daubert
decision, for example, was intended to provide factors that
would guide lower courts, as were decisions that followed236;
whether or not the Court successfully provided useful guidance
is another question, but at least the Court knew full well what
it had set out to do. One initial recommendation is that courts
should at minimum clarify differences between what is meant
by the language of constitutional tests and the preexisting
backdrop of evidence-law rules. Given the deferential and appellate context in which constitutional evidence claims may be
commonly litigated, such rules of the road can be particularly
important.
When a constitutional or subconstitutional standard uses
the term “reliability,” is that a placeholder for nonexclusion of
any type of evidence, or does a court really mean to refer to
evidentiary concern with the reliability of the evidence? Clearer
definitions would help, but connection and conflict is inevitable. More work should be done to define principles independent of surrounding evidence rules. Perhaps it is far easier to
regulate due process rules regarding fair defense and no outright falsification of evidence than Confrontation Clause type
rights, in which an entire body of new doctrine must be created. After all, due process rules may share an underlying
concern with reliability and can overlap with concerns expressed in rules of evidence like Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Even if constitutional interpretation requires very different
236
See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147–53 (1999)
(applying Daubert to non-scientist experts); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 138–39 (1997) (establishing abuse of discretion as the standard of
review for a trial court’s rejection of scientific evidence).
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methods and the values underlying a particular provision depart from evidentiary concerns, a court will necessarily want to
examine whether a constitutional right improves accuracy of
outcomes.
Is the constitutional right violated if certain types of evidence are considered at a civil or criminal trial? Does the right
require suppression of highly reliable evidence? Or does it in
fact help ensure more reliable judgments? Does the right provide guidance to jurors, or should jurors be trusted to reach
decisions in the area without further guidance? Does the right
improve upon traditional evidentiary rules or impose real costs
to litigation? Those costs may be justified, but if they are not
discussed or analyzed then they cannot be weighed properly.
And other actors may use their discretion to avoid the consequences of a rule that imposes costs on their work, or to conceal evidence of its violation, making the constitutional rule
moot or distorting its operation. The Supreme Court has
reached very different answers to those questions in different
branches of its due process jurisprudence, demanding quantified precision and expressing skepticism of juries when imposing punitive damages on corporations, but expressing
reluctance to regulate accuracy of evidence such as eyewitness
evidence that may place individuals in prison.
In contrast, a norm of deference to evidence law does not
begin to explain the Supreme Court’s varied constitutional rulings. The Court should instead do more work to justify why, for
example, the Due Process Clause requires careful assessment
of evidence in some areas and not in others. Simple rubrics
could improve the area, mirroring canons of constitutional
avoidance and construction widely used by courts.
E. Reviewing Conflicting Constitutional and Evidence
Rules
A court should first describe whether there is a conflict
between the constitutional right and an evidence-law rule. The
Supreme Court has identified as a situation in which constitutional law might “trump” evidence law, as noted, as one where
there was a “specific constitutional right” and a procedure providing a “specific remedy.”237 Such language begs the question
237
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565 (1967) (noting “the emphasis there
was on protection of a specific constitutional right, and the Jackson procedure
was designed as a specific remedy to ensure that an involuntary confession was
not in fact relied upon by the jury.” (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964))).
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why the constitutional right was interpreted to provide a “specific” remedy. Certainly, constitutional text should always be
the starting place. However, one is unlikely to encounter a
state law that runs directly afoul of the text of a constitutional
right. Instead, an evidentiary ruling may fail to provide relief
on an objection also raising a constitutional (as well as evidentiary) claim, and the question may come up on appeal whether
the trial court failed to adequately protect the constitutional
interest.
One could imagine an approach involving three steps in
clarifying a conflict. First, a court should first articulate which
evidentiary practices implicate constitutional concerns. In
some of the Supreme Court’s constitutional rulings, for example, the particular evidentiary rules implicated by a possible
interpretation are not clearly identified. Second, the court
should ask whether there is a conflict or not between the constitutional right and that evidentiary rule or rules. A conflict
would exist if an evidentiary rule would call for evidence to be
excluded at a proceeding but a constitutional rule would call
for that evidence to be admitted. A conflict would similarly
exist if an evidentiary rule would permit the evidence to be
admitted at a proceeding but a constitutional rule would call
for the evidence to be excluded. A different type of conflict
could occur not as to the result but the rationale, if both rules
would counsel the same result but for different reasons. Clarifying the different reasons might be useful, but in such a case a
court need not reach a constitutional question at all.238
Third, the court could then ask whether the conflict can be
avoided by a narrower construction of the constitutional right,
interpreting the right as compatible with evidentiary concerns.
Whether a doctrine of constitutional avoidance, outright, is

238
No required “order of battle” would be necessary, of course. Addressing the
merits of a constitutional question has much to recommend it, for a range of
reasons, much developed in the context of qualified immunity and constitutional
torts by Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr. and others. See John M.M. Greabe,
Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights
Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 407–08 (1999); John C. Jeffries,
Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115,
116–17 (2009); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1, 49 (2002). For the argument that judges should tend to have discretion
to treat the nonconstitutional merits question first, see Thomas Healy, The Rise of
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 857 (2005); Pierre N.
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249,
1275–81 (2006).
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preferable is a larger question.239 In an area involving a potentially complex intersection, clearly defining the evidence-law
rule and the constitutional right is itself an important goal. A
doctrine of constitutional avoidance would serve less of a purpose if the potentially conflicting rules are themselves clearly
set out. There is no need to avoid conflict if there is no conflict.
An explicit avoidance canon may not be justified in the
same way in the evidence arena as when interpreting federal
statutes. Many canons of statutory interpretation, broadly
speaking, are thought to prefer continuity of practice and require clear statements of various kinds in statutory text, in
order to justify a disruption to pre-existing practice.240 State
and federal evidence rules are nonconstitutional, and ruling
based on an interpretation of those rules can avoid the need to
reach a constitutional question (just as the Supreme Court will
not rule if there is an independent and adequate state law
ground supporting a state court’s decision241). In the context
of statutory interpretation, the judicial deference is chiefly due
to legislative judgments, including as expressed in text, and
typically conceived as a legislative supremacy question of
whether a federal court should defer to Congress.242 In contrast, evidence law arises from more complex and sometimes
overlapping sources, sometimes without authoritative statutory text, including common-law rules, legislative codes, state
and federal judges’ interpretations of those rules, and state or
federal judiciary committee-drafted jury instructions. The
same considerations do not necessarily apply where evidence
law is judge-made and state judge-made, or largely made by
professional bodies of practicing lawyers. Nor is the preexisting
practice always as opaque in evidence law. There are real concerns that appellate courts may lack adequate expertise, as
well as concern with disruption of litigation and trial practice,
239
See generally Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
71, 90–97 (1995) (questioning whether the Court should always avoid constitutional questions whenever possible).
240
See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 944 (1992); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the
Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1422 (2005).
241
See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (“[W]hen, as in
this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or
to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will
accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.”).
242
See William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 836 n.14 (2001).
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together with concerns regarding facilitating or frustrating enforcement of the underlying civil or criminal matters. Those are
the concerns reflected in Justice Jackson’s statements expressing reluctance to interfere with the larger body of evidence
law, and the Court’s federalism-based deference to state evidence-law rules in some of its decisions.
Whether any general and normative canon preferring existing evidence-law rules is justified is doubtful.243 I have
called into question whether any such canon currently exists in
actual practice. The Supreme Court, while stating a reluctance
at times to interfere in evidence law, has never accorded such a
view the status of a formal canon or rule of construction. Nor
are evidence codes, as noted, to be interpreted in a manner
resembling the elements of a statute. Any deference to evidence law would involve only the general principle of constitutional avoidance or general principles of federalism and
deference to other rule-making bodies.
If the conflict cannot be avoided by a fully compatible interpretation of the constitutional right, then the constitutional
right should “trump.” Such outright conflict, however, will not
always occur. In still additional areas, the constitutional right
may help to vindicate evidentiary concerns (with fairness as
reliability), and there may be special reasons to interpret the
constitutional right to buttress evidence rules. To analyze such
questions, particularly if a conflict has been identified, courts
might then benefit from “Brandeis briefs” providing careful digests of lower-court evidentiary rulings, in order to carefully
assess how constitutional rules are in fact being applied (and
perhaps creating more incentives for lower courts to document
such rulings or model rulings or instructions themselves).244 If
the evidence rule in conflict with the constitutional rule is an
“outlier” and not accepted practice in a given state, or across
the statutes, then there would not be the same degree of conflict or concern with supplanting the rule.245
243
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1586–87 (2000) (criticizing
normative canons of construction).
244
A “Brandeis brief” refers to a brief relying extensively on scientific evidence,
after Louis D. Brandeis’s filings digesting social science research, particularly in
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See Brief for the Defendant in Error (No.
107), Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), reprinted in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
245
See generally Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929,
930–48 (2014) (describing various categories of state law “outliers” displaced by
constitutional rulings).
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An explicit consideration of the content and policy of potentially conflicting evidence law would amount to a departure
from a constitutional approach limited to interpreting the
meaning of the constitutional text. As I have argued throughout, however, when a constitutional right regulates matters of
evidence, the right and remedy are regularly interpreted based
on the current policy and legal practice implicated. Conflicts
between evidence rules and constitutional rules could be better
resolved through a more formalized balancing test, or through
levels of scrutiny, whether formalized or not. As discussed in
the prior sections, such analysis should take far better account
of the underlying purposes and values served by both evidence
rules and constitutional rights. The problem is in some ways
similar to that in any area, where as Professor Aaron-Andrew
Bruhl has recently explored, the Supreme Court must consider, to some degree, lower-court precedent in elaborating a
constitutional rule.246
However, evidence law requires knowledge of practice, and
trial practice at that,247 together with practical challenges in
obtaining evidence and presenting facts during litigation.
Lower courts may often be better situated to assess conflict
between evidence and constitutional rules and to define the
scope of remedies pretrial and at trial.248 The problem is more
complex and closer to the ground than the more standard situation in which state law rules or lower-court rules may or may
not inform a constitutional rule.249 And to be sure, as Professor Richard Fallon and others have emphasized, the Court and
federal courts generally may have incentives not to bind themselves to rigid limitations on interpretive approaches.250
Evidence-law values and constitutional values will often
coincide, particularly, I have argued, as to concern with relia246
See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 860–91 (2014) (surveying a variety of reasons that higher
courts might justifiably defer to lower-court decisions).
247
For criticism of Supreme Court Justices’ unfamiliarity with trial practice,
see Kevin M. Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 850–52 (2010).
248
Making that argument regarding the exclusionary rule, see Evan H.
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994).
249
Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court
Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 1022–26 (2004).
250
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CAL. L. REV. 975,
1013 (2009) (“[T]he justices have seldom exhibited much interest in attempting to
bind either themselves or each other, in advance, to the kind of general interpretive approaches [to constitutional adjudication] that academic theorists
champion.”).
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bility. Weak and unreliable evidence that also may have been
coerced from a suspect should be of greater constitutional concern than evidence that was coerced. Evidence rules and constitutional rules could strengthen each other. The Court has
sought to rely on evidence rules at times, but not just to avoid
conflict for its own sake. Courts could do still better by doing
so to improve the quality of the underlying right. Failing to
reconcile evidence-law values and constitutional values will
lead to complex conflicts, and unless the courts try to create a
complex series of trumps, the difficulty of reviewing evidencelaw rulings on appeal creates a recipe for the underenforcement of constitutional rights. If the goal is to enforce constitutional rights, engaging with evidence law and trying to inform
evidence rules, is necessary. Rules like the Miranda rule and
the elaboration of the Court’s Confrontation Clause rulings,
then, look more like the necessary work to be done if a constitutional right is to have meaning at a trial. Far more work like
that may have to be done in a range of other constitutional
context for those rights to provide adequate protection at criminal and civil trials.
CONCLUSION
Courts should not interpret constitutional rights to needlessly overturn established rules of evidence but nor should
they turn away from rulings that can minimize unconstitutional verdicts based on unsound or unreliable evidence. What
my analysis suggests, first and foremost, is that avoiding the
evidentiary problems raised by the interpretation of constitutional rights can create at least some of the very perverse consequences that courts often seek to avoid. Even if not quite
accomplishing the opposite of the intended effect, displacing
traditional evidence rules can create serious problems, since
the courts must then create an alternative set of constitutional
tests to cover all of the same ground and yet still somehow be
compatible at the margins with evidence rules that do still apply. The Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
even if the new test is a superior and constitutionally justified
one, raises all of those difficult problems, and the solutions will
likely increasingly rely on the rules of evidence.
My analysis also calls into question the Supreme Court’s
sometimes-stated aversion to regulating reliability of evidence,
despite a central due process concern with reliability, particularly in criminal cases. Where highly unreliable evidence
places a constitutional right in particular jeopardy, merely cit-
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ing to the fact that traditional evidence law can in theory regulate reliability of evidence is no longer a convincing feint.
Reliability of evidence is important to a range of constitutional
rights, as are procedural justice concerns. An unreliable or
outright false confession may implicate not only due process
but also Fifth Amendment concerns. Unreliable punitive damages verdicts receive greater scrutiny in some respects under
the Due Process Clause. Unreliable eyewitness identifications
should implicate greater due process concerns, but the doctrine remains outdated and underdeveloped. An indigent defendant should receive the benefit of a needed and reliable
expert witness. Outright false or unreliable convictions should
receive greater post-conviction scrutiny consistent with the
Due Process Clause emphasis on reliability.251 And the
Supreme Court, along with lower courts, will continue to grapple with how to reconcile the Crawford approach to the Confrontation Clause with a range of practical evidence-law
concerns.
The solution, I have argued, is for courts to clearly articulate whether a constitutional right implicates evidential rules.
Second, the court should ask whether there is a conflict between the constitutional right and that evidentiary rule or
rules. Third, the court could then ask whether the conflict can
be avoided by a narrower construction of the constitutional
right, interpreting the right as compatible with evidentiary
concerns.
What does this approach mean for constitutional interpretation more generally? In some respects, the proposed steps
operate as rules of identification of nonconstitutional grounds
and possible avoidance of constitutional questions. Such rules
are used in other constitutional settings, primarily when reviewing legislation, as noted, or when avoiding a decision based
on independent state law grounds. However, I have also argued that avoidance is not always possible or desirable when a
constitutional right is in potential conflict with evidence law.
At the final stage, courts can and should seek to accommodate
constitutional and evidence-law concerns, or clearly define the
differences in approach. Such reasoning does not require some
other form of constitutional interpretation. For example, text
or original meaning or precedent may play central roles in defining the constitutional right itself, but as I have argued,
251
See generally Garrett, supra note 110, at 121–30 (analyzing data on convicts who were later exonerated by DNA evidence and concluding that modern
criminal trial procedures generate a high likelihood of false convictions).

R
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sometimes articulated and sometimes unarticulated policy
considerations play an outsized role in interpreting the scope of
that right and how it applies to affect evidence law. Civil and
criminal practice, together with evidence law, has changed so
much since the Founding and Reconstruction that history may
be a poor guide in each of the relevant areas.252 In the Confrontation Clause setting, as described, the Justices, having
announced the Court’s rule (relying heavily in Crawford on
Founding-era sources), then had to engage in subsequent decisions with modern practice and applications of the rule. Thus,
I do not take any position in this Article on the largest question
regarding how courts should generally interpret the Constitution, a question, of course, about which Justices and judges
themselves have disagreed. Instead, I have argued that in areas such as constitutional evidence law where policy often does
matter to interpretation, the relevant underlying values should
be clearly articulated.
When reliability or other evidence-law-based tests are
deemed not workable, or are not desirable as a matter of constitutional interpretation due to a constitutional focus on procedural justice over reliability, as in the Confrontation Clause
setting, then courts must still engage with questions of
whether or how to accommodate constitutional rules with related evidence-law rules. Not only should the Supreme Court
step in, as in Crane v. Kentucky, to correct evidentiary misuse
of constitutional doctrine, but courts should positively engage
with evidence-law rules and application. That is why it is a
mistake to view rulings such as Miranda as an outlier or exceptional regulation of pretrial evidence gathering and preservation of privilege. Connections between evidence law and
252
Whether history provides any support for the Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, for example, I leave to other scholars. For a skeptical view, see
generally Thomas Y. Davies, What did the Framers Know, and When did They
Know it? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105,
120–89 (2005) (disputing as a historical matter Justice Scalia’s contention in
Crawford that “a rigid cross-examination rule was part of the American understanding of the ‘common-law’ confrontation right at the time the federal Bill of
Rights was adopted”); Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation
for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 77–87 (2005) (likewise arguing
that “the ratification history shows that the Confrontation Clause is not a reference to the English common law of hearsay”); but see Richard D. Friedman, The
Mold that Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 433, 434 (2014) (“However much
one may quibble about details, the basic historical thesis of Crawford is correct:
The confrontation right, as stated in the Sixth Amendment and recognized over
centuries in the common law system, reflects a principle about how witnesses
should give testimony—under oath, face-to-face with the adverse party, and subject to cross-examination.”).
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constitutional rights arise whenever a constitutional right relates to the criminal or civil trial process. Those connections do
not simply take the blunt form of a constitutional right as a
“trump” over evidence law, but rather require a more complex
engagement between constitutional and evidence-law procedures and interests.
Justice Jackson had it right that it can upset the entire
edifice to “pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure.”253 But acting as if a constitutional right that directly
regulates civil or criminal cases belongs to a different structure
than the body of evidence rules governing civil or criminal trials
cannot wish the problem away. Constitutional rules create
rules of decision, but they can also impact rules of evidence.
When judges interpret the Constitution, careful attention to the
structure and potentially conflicting purposes of evidence rules
is warranted, even when trying to avoid undue interference
with the law of evidence. Constitutional rules can instead, in
the most hopeful result, be interpreted to strengthen rights and
improve the reliability of rules of evidence. A superficial interpretation of a constitutional right may avoid engaging with evidence-law applications, but it will not provide much guidance
or protection during litigation.
Blithely avoiding evidentiary problems raised by interpretation of constitutional rights can lead to the collapse of the
entire structure—the very “grotesque” result that the court
sought to avoid. The exchange between constitutional law and
evidence law should flow both ways. Constitutional rights can
safeguard against evidence-law rules and litigation practices
that place accuracy and fairness in jeopardy. In return, evidence law has something to offer constitutional theory: to improve the effectiveness of constitutional protections and to
prevent unanticipated erosion of constitutional rights.

253

Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).

